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The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case
will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not
by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.'
The Attorney General assures me that our case [against General Ma-
nuel Noriega] is strong, our resolve is firm and our legal representa-
tions are sound.2
INTRODUCTION
The scenes are familiar. A United States Attorney calls a press confer-
ence to announce the indictment in a high-profile prosecution. A re-
porter calls or stops by the district attorney's office, obtains "off the
record" information from a lawyer about an upcoming trial, and pub-
lishes it. A prosecutor gives an interview on the courthouse steps during
a criminal jury trial.
Such scenes, though familiar, are not the norm for criminal prosecu-
tions-most charges prosecuted in state and federal courts receive
neither public comment from prosecutors nor press interest or coverage.3
1. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
2. Transcript of Bush News Conference on Noriega and Panama, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6,
1990, at 10, col. 1.
3. See A. Friendly & R. Goldfarb, Crime and Publicity 55-72 (1967); R. Graber,
Crime News and the Public 40, table 2.9 (1980) (finding Chicago Tribune reported only
.65 of 1 percent of crimes in Chicago); Antunes & Hurley, The Representation of Crimi-
nalEvents in Houston's Two Daily Newspapers, 54 Journ. Q. 756 (1977) (Houston dailies
published stories on no more than .75 of I percent of crimes reported to police); Cohen, A
Comparison of Crime Coverage in the Detroit and Atlanta Newspapers, 52 Joum. Q. 726
(1975) (Detroit newspapers covered 1.9 percent and Atlanta papers 3.19 percent of re-
ported crimes); Frasca, Estimating the Occurrence of Trials Prejudiced by Press Coverage,
72 Judicature 162, 165 (Oct.-Nov. 1988) (estimating 7 percent of all felony cases resulting
in arrest are reported by metropolitan newspapers). Judge J. Skelley Wright once esti-
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Enough charges do receive such attention, however, to raise questions
about the constitutional rights of free speech and fair trial, the integrity
of the judicial process, the interaction between lawyers and journalists,
and the professional obligations of attorneys.
Some of those questions concern extrajudicial public comment from
prosecutors about pending criminal cases, a phenomenon that appears to
be on the rise 4 There is no definitive Supreme Court precedent concern-
ing the scope of first amendment protection for such speech, though the
Court said in 1966 that "[c]ollaboration between counsel and the press as
to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject
to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary
measures."
5
Lawyer speech is strictly regulated in the courtroom. Rules of proce-
dure and evidence and the need to preserve some degree of order and
decorum strictly limit what lawyers and other trial participants can say,
especially in the presence of the jury. For example, the prosecutor is
barred from expressing a personal opinion on the guilt of the accused,7
from referring to evidence that may be relevant but has not been admit-
ted because it is unduly prejudicial (prior criminal record) or was ob-
tained improperly (coerced confession), or from alluding to plea bargain
mated that less than one percent of all criminal cases receive publicity. See Wright, Fair
Trial-Free Press, 38 F.R.D. 435, 436 (1966).
4. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report of the Ad Hoe Com-
mittee on Pretrial Publicity 3 (1987) [hereinafter Ad Hoe Report on Publicity].
5. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). The Court recently denied certi-
orari in a Tennessee case which concerned the discipline of a prosecutor for public state-
ments about two of his cases. See Zimmerman v. Board of Professional Responsibility,
764 S.W.2d 757 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3160 (1989).
Justice Rehnquist, acting as Circuit Justice, expressed some views on this issue in
KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 459 U.S. 1302 (1982). Press appli-
cants requested a stay of an Arizona trial court's order restricting criminal trial partici-
pants, including counsel, from speaking with the press. The judge appointed a court
employee as a press liaison. Denying the application, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the
language in Sheppard, see supra text accompanying note 3, "goes far towards sustaining
the action of the trial court." KPNXBroadcasting, 459 U.S. at 1306. "The mere poten-
tial for confusion if unregulated communication between trial participants and the press
at a heavily covered trial were permitted is enough to warrant a measure such as the trialjudge took in this case." Id. at 1307.
6. "[C]ourts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested ... with power to
impose silence, respect and decorum in their presence,... and as a corollary to this
proposition, to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of
pollution." Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821). In Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), the Court imposed strict limitations on a trial judge's capac-
ity to punish by contempt the out-of-court speech of nonparties but strongly reaffirmed
the constitutional power of trial judges "to protect themselves from disturbances and
disorder in the court room by use of contempt probeedings." Id. at 266.
7. See United States v. Smith, 778 F.2d 925, 929 (2d Cir. 1985); Wilson v. State, 371
So. 2d 126, 127 (Fla. 1978); Hoerner v. State, 246 Ga. 374, 375, 271 S.E.2d 458, 460
(1980); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-24 (1981).
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negotiations.' No serious first amendment claim can be made that such
courtroom speech should be free from restriction.9
But what happens when the prosecutor steps outside the courtroom?
Lawyers cannot go directly to jurors before or during trial and advocate
their case out of court°--why should they be able to do so publicly when
jurors or prospective jurors might hear them?" Can the court or the
lawyer disciplinary process impose limits on such speech without run-
ning afoul of the first amendment? Is the prosecutor entitled to as much
constitutional protection as is afforded to the press or the general public,
or should it be easier to gag the prosecutor than the press? 2
Most commentary on extrajudicial lawyer speech has focused on crim-
inal defense counsel;" several authors have argued that defense attorneys
should enjoy freedom from ethical rules limiting extrajudicial com-
ment.14 No one makes such arguments on the prosecutor's behalf, for it
is the prosecutor's extrajudicial publicizing, not defense counsel's, that
might imperil the defendant's fair trial right. The prevailing view is that
prosecutor statements are more likely to influence prospective jurors' 5
8. Indeed, "[a] prosecutor may not directly refer to or even allude to evidence that
was not adduced at trial." United States v. Murrah, 888 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1989).
9. In Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977), Justice Stevens stated broadly that
"offensive language in a courtroom... may surely be regulated." Id. at 318 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
10. The ethical rules flatly prohibit such contact. Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-108(A)
provides that "[before the trial of a case a lawyer... shall not communicate with...
anyone he knows to be a member of the venire." Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility DR 7-108(A) (1981). DR 7-108(B) provides that during the trial of a case a lawyer
connected with the case "shall not communicate with... any member of the jury."
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-108(B) (1981). Model Rule ("MR") 3.5
provides that a lawyer shall not "seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or
other official by means prohibited by law" or "communicate ex parte with such a person
except as permitted by law." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.5 (1987).
11. The answer does not emerge from designation of courtrooms and lawyer-juror
out-of-court communications as non-public forums, see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983), because the speech regulation at issue is not
content-neutral and categorical forum designation would otherwise cloud first amend-
ment analysis. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-24, at 986-97 (2d ed.
1988); infra text accompanying notes 262-289.
12. See Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 Stan. L. Rev.
411, 429-30 (1977) (distinguishing restraints on the press from restraints on lawyers and
parties).
13. See, eg., Swift, Model Rule 3.6: An Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attor-
ney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 1003, 1033-41 (1984); Note, First Amendment Protec-
lion of Criminal Defense Attorneys' Extrajudical Statements in the Decade Since
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 8 Whittier L. Rev. 1021 (1987).
14. See, eg., Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by
Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v. Obiter Dictum, 29 Stan. L. Rev.
607, 613-19 (1977); Comment, Silence Orders-Preserving Political Expression by Defend-
ants and Their Lawyers, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 595, 604, 606-08 (1970).
15. See, eg., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 253 (7th Cir. 1975)
(prosecutors "are a prime source of damaging statements"), cert denied, 427 U.S. 912(1976); In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 658, 449 A.2d 505, 512 (1982) (prosecutor's state-
ments "particularly telling").
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and that prosecutors, more than defense lawyers or lawyers in other set-
tings, may more readily violate no-comment rules. 16
Lawyers, especially prosecutors, should not, in my judgment, "try
their cases in the press" and should confine to the courtroom what they
say in public about a pending case. Notwithstanding what may be desir-
able and prudent, "[w]e must not confuse what is 'good,' 'desirable,' or
'expedient' with what is constitutionally commanded by the First
Amendment." 17 Not long ago it was readily assumed that, although the
press generally could not be restrained from, or punished for, publishing
information about matters of public concern, lawyers were amenable to
court discipline for statements that might affect the right to a fair trial. 8
Cases in the lawyer advertising area, however, have shown that official
efforts to discipline lawyer speech are subject to first amendment
scrutiny.19
The extreme cases are easy to resolve. Few, if any, would justify a
prosecutor calling a press conference on the eve of trial to reveal that a
defendant in a high-profile case had been on the verge of entering a plea
agreement. Conversely, few would question the right of a prosecutor to
disclose publicly, in advance of trial, the identity of another prosecutor
who would be assisting in the courtroom. In many instances, however,
the answers are not so clear. Courts, prosecutors, and the press need to
know the scope of permissible prosecutor speech.
16. See C. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 635 (1986). Several cases have reviewed
extrajudicial prosecutor speech in light of attorney no comment rules. See, eg., United
States v. Troutman, 814 F.2d 1428, 1444-45 (10th Cir. 1987); Owens v. State, 613 P.2d
259, 262 (Alaska 1980); State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 526, 703 P.2d 464,470 (1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1110 (1986); Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 575-76 (Del. Super. Ct.
1981); Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 476 So. 2d 775, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 313-14, 369 S.E.2d 232, 238 (1988), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 225 (1988); Elder v. Commonwealth, 385 Mass. 128, 129-30, 431
N.E.2d 571, 573 (1982); State ex rel Coburn v. Bennett, 202 Mont. 20, 655 P.2d 502, 509
(1982); State v. Rife, 215 Neb. 132, 139, 337 N.W.2d 724, 729 (1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1070 (1984); State v. Beigenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 37, 524 A.2d 130, 144 (1987); In re
Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 652-62, 449 A.2d 505, 509-14; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 23
Ohio App. 3d 159, 161, 492 N.E.2d 459, 460 (1985); Harvell v. State, 742 P.2d 1138,
1140 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); In re Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 123-30, 673 P.2d 855, 856-60
(1983); In re Burrows, 290 Or. 131, 134-36, 618 P.2d 1283, 1284-85 (1980); Common-
wealth v. Anderson, 294 Pa. Super. 1, 11-12, 439 A.2d 720, 725 (1981); Commonwealth
v. Scarpino, 494 Pa. 421, 429-33, 431 A.2d 926, 930-32 (1981); Zimmermann v. Board of
Professional Responsibility, 764 S.W.2d 757, 758-63 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3160(1989); In re Hansen, 584 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1978); State v. Hohman, 138 Vt. 502,
505-08, 420 A.2d 852, 855-56 (1980); State v. Wixon, 30 Wash. App. 63, 69-71, 631 P.2d
1033, 1038-39 (1981); State v. Moss, 376 S.E.2d 569, 573-74 (W. Va. 1988).
17. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 13 (1978) (plurality).
18. See Ad Hoc Report on Publicity, supra note 4, at 1.
19. See, eg., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (ban on lawyer
direct mail solicitation involving truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients
known to face legal problems unconstitutional as violation of first and fourteenth amend-
ments), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3160 (1989); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350(1977) (total ban on advertising of prices by private attorneys violates first and fourteenth
amendments).
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The prosecutor does not relinquish free speech rights by virtue of being
a prosecutor.20 The press and the public have a first amendment interest
in receiving his statements.21 Accordingly, the prosecutor merits free
speech shelter. However, his role in the criminal justice system and the
accused's fair trial and other rights complicate the first amendment anal-
ysis. Indeed, of all lawyers, criminal and civil, the prosecutor wishing to
make a public comment about a pending case faces the most difficult
considerations in deciding what he can say. Also, of all lawyers, prosecu-
tors generally are considered to be the least entitled to make public com-
ment on a pending case.22
It is under precisely these circumstances-uncertainty about limits
and general sentiment that a particular speaker should be regulated-
when great care is needed to reconcile free expression with competing
interests. Although the Supreme Court has held consistently that re-
straints on free expression may be "permitted for appropriate reasons,123
the challenge in regulating prosecutor speech is to resist unnecessary
compromise of speech values.
Restrictions on prosecutor speech relating to a pending case constitute
content regulation, which normally is subject to the most stringent first
amendment scrutiny. The context of extrajudicial prosecutor speech,
however, justifies regulation under certain circumstances. This Article
briefly reviews the evolution of government restrictions on lawyer com-
ment about pending cases, largely an interplay between the formulation
of rules limiting lawyer speech and landmark judicial opinions in fair
trial and free press cases. The Article then examines the competing val-
ues at issue when prosecutor speech occurs and identifies common fea-
tures of the situations in which such speech takes place. It next presents
a constitutional analysis of speech limits based on the government inter-
ests involved and relevant features of these contexts. The Article at-
tempts to account for the clash of values and the complexity of context
20. See In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 614, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (1982) ("Like other citizens,
attorneys are entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment, even as participants
in the administration of justice.").
21. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980). Courts
have recognized that gag orders restraining extrajudicial lawyer speech raise free press
issues by impeding the newsgathering ability and thereby grant the press standing to
challenge them. See, eg., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 606-08 (2d Cir.) (gag
order restraining communications with trial participants), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377
(1988); Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Ct., 781 F.2d 1443, 1445
(9th Cir. 1986) (court order denying media access to trial counsel); National Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Cooperman, 116 A.D.2d 287, 289, 501 N.Y.S.2d 405,406 (1986) (gag order on
all trial counsel gives standing to press).
22. "[Ihe Court believes that of the three separate groups subject to the restraints
[on extrajudicial speech] (Government, defendants, defense counsel), the Government is
most susceptible to supervision by the Court." United States v. Simon, 664 F. Supp. 780,
785 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub nom In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988); see Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F.2d 590,
602 (9th Cir. 1985) (Sneed, J., concurring), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
23. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).
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without surrendering the search for practical standards to accommodate
those values and guide conduct. It attempts to avoid slavish adherence
to formal abstractions of decisional law without breaking unrealistically
from first amendment doctrine that courts are likely to follow and
respect.
The Article concludes that rules in this area have been evolving in an
appropriate direction but that refinements are needed to better account
for the unique role of the speaker, the changing context of the speech,
and the competing interests at stake. Those refinements concern degree
of threatened harm, burden of proof, intent of the speaker, timing of the
speech, identity of the factfinder, and the form of regulation. The Article
suggests that it is preferable for the trial judge in a particular case to
address prejudice problems posed by extrajudicial prosecutor speech
rather than rely on the lawyer disciplinary process.
I. RlST CTIONS ON EXTRAJuDICIAL LAWYER COMMENT
[T]rial by newspaper is a real problem in this country, especially in
criminal trials.... I do not think that the newspapers should be
blamed for this or that anything should be done to curb them from
printing anything to which they can get acess.... However, we
would eliminate a large part of this prejudicial publicity if we would
only enforce the canons of ethics that now exist. I do not think that
any lawyer, whether defense or prosecution, should ever make a com-
ment to the press evaluating his case or any evidence. 24
Restrictions on extrajudicial lawyer comment about pending cases
have taken two principal forms: (1) disciplinary or court rules governing
extrajudicial lawyer speech; and (2) judicial restraining orders. There are
others. For example, prosecutor speech may also be regulated by em-
ployers, possibly based on agency regulations' or informal personnel ac-
24. Schwab, Interview with Edward Bennett Williams, Litigation 28, 30-31 (Winter
1986).
25. Government attorney offices have promulgated rules and guidelines governing
prosecutor interaction with the press. The most notable are the rules imposed by the
Department of Justice. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1989). Since 1965 Justice Department reg-
ulations, known as the Katzenbach restrictions, have banned the release of certain infor-
mation relating to pending proceedings. These regulations are supplemented in 2 The
Department of Justice Manual 1-7.001 (1987), which sets forth several policies, including
that "news conferences should not be held to announce investigations, indictments, or
arrests." Id. at 1-285. Like DR 7-107 and MR 3.6, the Katzenbach restrictions adopt
both a specific list of prohibitions and a test of degree of harm. This list includes observa-
tions about a defendant's character; statements attributable to a defendant; statements
concerning the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses; opinions about
the guilt of the accused; and statements concerning evidence or arguments in a case,
including whether it will be used at trial. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2(b)(6) (1989).
Furthermore, local prosecution offices typically adopt policies governing contact with
the press. See, ag., Policy #55, Salt Lake County Attorney Policy and Procedures, Pub-
lic Statements and Media Releases (1983).
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tion.26 Alternatively, defendants have sued prosecutors to recover civil
damages for deprivation of fair trial rights caused by prejudicial public-
ity-' Most states and the federal system prohibit government attorneys
from disclosing matters presented before a grand jury.28 Another regula-
tory possibility is disqualification of the prosecutor from the case.29 The
focus of this Article, however, is on the two principal forms of restraint
outside the grand jury context."0
A. Disciplinary Rules
The regulation of lawyer speech by rule has developed mainly through
attorney codes of ethics. Most states have adopted a form of the Ameri-
can Bar Association ("ABA") model ethical rules on extrajudicial lawyer
26. See, e.g., Loose Lips, Nat'I L.L, Feb. 5, 1990, at 2, col. I (reporting U.S. Attorney
displeased with assistant for discussing case in interview on CBS News).
27. Extrajudicial prosecutor speech has been the target of civil claims against the
prosecutor brought by former criminal defendants. The claims are for defamation or for
violation of civil rights based on deprivation of a fair trial. Prosecutors generally have
immunity from such claims for what they say in court. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 424-31 (1976) (prosecutor absolutely immune in Section 1983 actions brought for
initiating prosecution); cf. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (absolute immunity for
press release of Office of Housing Expediter). See generally Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 586 (1977) (attorney in judicial proceeding absolutely privileged to publish de-
famatory matter); R. Sack, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 268-71 (1980). How-
ever, courts have determined that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity
against claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on extrajudicial statements. See,
e.g., Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 791 (11th Cir. 1988) (prosecutor could be liable
for fourteenth amendment due process violation by issuing a defamatory press release);
Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding "that only qualified good faith
immunity is available where a prosecutor distributes extraneous statements to the press
designed to gain unfair advantage at trial"); Stepanian v. Addis, 699 F.2d 1046, 1048
(11th Cir. 1983) (prosecutor not absolutely immune if statement not part of his discre-
tionary duties). See generally Boyer, Civil Liability for Prejudicial Pre-Tal Statements
by Prosecutors, 15 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 231 (1978) (prosecutor's prejudicial and improper
statement affecting defendant's right to fair trial should not be absolutely immune).
Recent examples include a 1987 federal suit brought by former U.S. Labor Secretary
Raymond Donovan's construction company as well as its affiliates and officials against
Bronx prosecutor Mario Merola and his assistant for $500,000 plus punitive damages for
statements made to the press after Donovan and seven other defendants were indicted for
criminal fraud. Also in 1987, the "Twilight Zone" movie's helicopter pilot filed a claim
for $300,000 in damages for remarks made by Los Angeles deputy district attorney Lea
Purwin D'Agostino when she was visiting the site of a crash that resulted in manslaugh-
ter charges against the pilot and others. See Prosecutors Face Civil Suits, 73 A.B.A. . 28
(Sept. 1987).
28. See, eg., Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2).
29. See, e.g., State v. Hohman, 138 Vt. 502, 505-06, 420 A.2d 852, 855 (1980) (posit-
ing that extrajudicial statements of prosecutor could warrant disqualification because bias
of prosecutor threatens defendant's right to fair trial).
30. Grand jury secrecy is based on governmental interests specific to the grand jury
context. See Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1380 (1990); Douglas Oil Co. v.
Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979). This Article's analysis suggests
that relatively stronger controls on extrajudicial prosecutor speech would be permissible
concerning grand jury proceedings than regarding other points in the criminal prosecu-
tion process, but because of the special characteristics of the grand jury, the discussion
does not include extrajudicial comment on grand jury proceedings.
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comment.31 Violation of the lawyer no-comment rules could subject a
lawyer to disciplinary action, which can result in sanctions ranging from
private reprimand to disbarment.
During the twentieth century, the ABA has promulgated three model
no-comment rules. Canon 20 of the 1908 ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics "generally" condemned lawyer comment to the press about pend-
ing or anticipated litigation to preserve an aura conducive to a fair trial. 32
This standard was so vague that it was difficult to apply and did not
adequately warn speakers what was permitted and what was pro-
scribed.33 Canon 20 was rarely enforced.34
Fair trial and free speech issues received pronounced attention as a
result of press coverage of the Kennedy assassination and the Supreme
Court's 1966 decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell,35 which condemned as a
violation of due process the impact on a criminal trial of publicity aided
and abetted by the trial participants. The Warren Commission Report36
kindled an ABA study and the promulgation in 1968 of fair trial and free
speech standards limiting lawyer publicity which poses a reasonable like-
lihood of preventing a fair trial. The "reasonable likelihood" language
was taken from the Court's opinion in Sheppard.38 At the same time, the
31. See C. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 12.2, at 635 (1986).
32. Canon 20 reads:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation
may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration ofjustice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme
circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unpro-
fessional to make it anonymously. An exparte reference to the facts should not
go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the Court; but even
in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex pare statement.
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 20 (1908), reprinted in Warvelle, Essays in
Legal Ethics 223 app. C (2d ed. 1920).
33. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 1979); Reardon, The Fair
Trial-Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A. J. 343, 344 (Apr. 1968).
34. See Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Committee on Radio,
Television, and the Administration of Justice, Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial: Final
Report with Recommendations 17 (1967) [hereinafter Medina Report]. But see State v.
Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964) (interpreting Canon 20 to pro-
hibit extrajudicial lawyer statements), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987 (1965).
35. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
36. The President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy:
Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Ken-
nedy 239 (1964) [hereinafter Warren Commission Report]. The Warren Commission Re-
port suggested that publicity might have prevented Lee Harvey Oswald from receiving a
fair trial in any venue. See ia
37. See American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press Approved Draft (1968) [hereinafter Reardon
Report]. The Reardon Report was one of several contemporaneous studies on fair trial
and free press. See American Newspaper Publishers Association, Free Press and Fair
Trial (1967) [hereinafter ANPA Report]; Medina Report, supra note 34; Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, Report of the
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45
F.R.D. 391 (1968) [hereinafter Kaufman Report].
38. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
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ABA was revising the 1908 Canons, and eventually adopted the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969.11 The 1969 Code incorpo-
rated the 1968 fair trial and free press standards on extrajudicial lawyer
comment in Disciplinary Rule 7-107 ("DR 7-107"). DR 7-107 contains
various lawyer no-comment directives and is reproduced in Appendix I
to this Article. Although the rule is a narrower proscription than Canon
20, the primary concern in light of Sheppard and the Warren Commis-
sion Report was curbing extrajudicial lawyer comment rather than safe-
guarding lawyer speech rights.'
DR 7-107 contains ten subsections. The first five address four phases
of criminal prosecutions. First, DR 7-107(A) lists five types of informa-
tion that may be disclosed in an extrajudicial statement during a criminal
investigation and proscribes elaboration of other information.4' Permit-
ted topics include public record information, information that the inves-
tigation is in progress, a description of the offense, a request for help in
apprehending the suspect, and any public dangers. Second, DR 7-107(B)
lists six types of information that may not be disclosed following initia-
tion of charges.4' These include the character or criminal record of the
accused, the possibility of a guilty plea, the existence or contents of a
confession, and opinion on the merits of the case. DR 7-107(C) lists
eleven types of information that DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer
from announcing,4' such as basic biographical data on the accused, the
nature of the charges, and the accused's denial of the charges.
Third, DR 7-107(D) prohibits statements during jury selection or trial
about the "trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are
reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial."'  Reference to public
records is permissible. Fourth, after trial or disposition without trial but
before sentencing, DR 7-107(E) proscribes statements that are "reason-
39. See ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (Final Draft July 1, 1969).
40. See Comment, Legal Aspects of the Fair Trial-Free Press Controversy: The Rear-
don Report Considered, 48 Neb. L. Rev. 1045, 1047 (1969).
41. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107 (1981) reprinted in Ap-
pendix I of this Article. The Vermont Supreme Court held recently that DR 7-107(A),
which applies to "[a] lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a
criminal matter," does not apply to defense lawyers who make out-of-court statements on
behalf of clients who may become criminal defendants. See In re Axelrod, 150 Vt. 136,
549 A.2d 653, 654-55 (1988). But see Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 144
Wis. 2d 284, 311-12, 423 N.W.2d 867, 878 (1988) (holding identical language applicable
to defense counsel).
42. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(B) (1981), reprinted in
Appendix I of this Article.
43. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(C) (1981), reprinted in
Appendix I of this Article; see also National District Attorneys Association National
Prosecution Standards, Standard 26.2 (1977) (listing of permitted and proscribed state-
ments similar to those in DR 7-107(Q).
44. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(D) (1981), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I of this Article.
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ably likely to affect the imposition of sentence."45 Each rule applies only
to extrajudicial statements that one would reasonably expect the press to
report. The no-comment rules governing investigation and pretrial peri-
ods do not expressly require any showing that the extrajudicial statement
threatened to or in fact interfered with a fair trial or the administration of
justice. The trial and post-trial rules adopt a reasonable likelihood of
threat standard. 6
Fair trial and free press issues took center stage again in 1976 when the
Supreme Court decided Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.7 The
Court struck down as violative of the first amendment a state trial court
gag order prohibiting news reporting or commentary on public judicial
proceedings in a high profile homicide case. Nebraska Press spurred an
ABA study on fair trial and free press issues.48 In 1978 the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice: Fair Trial and Free Press were revised to
permit more speech by incorporating a "clear and present danger" test to
govern restriction of extrajudicial lawyer speech.49 At about the same
time, the ABA appointed a committee-the Kutak Commission-to re-
draft the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983,
relied on the 1978 ABA fair trial and free press standards in formulating
Model Rule 3.6 on trial publicity. 0
Reproduced in Appendix II to this Article, MR 3.6 proscribes extraju-
dicial lawyer5" comment when "the lawyer knows or reasonably should
45. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(E) (1981), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I of this Article.
46. Disciplinary authorities also have relied on other rules to discipline attorneys for
public statements. For example, in Ramsey v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 771
S.W.2d 116 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 278 (1989), the Supreme Court of Tennessee
overturned a lower court's decision that the appellant could be disciplined for comments
critical of a judge. Such application of DR 8-102--"[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make
false accusations against a judge"-would violate the first amendment in this case. See
id. at 120-22 & n.5 (quoting Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 8-102
(1981)).
47. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
48. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 8-1.1(a) commentary, at 8-7
(2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter Goodwin Report]. The decision in Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), which held that
a local federal court rule patterned on DR 7-107 violated first amendment overbreadth
limits, also spurred re-evaluation of the Reardon Report proposals.
49. See Goodwin Report, supra note 48, at 8-10.
50. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 comment (2) (1987). The rule has
been described as "a companion Rule to Rule 3.4(a), which prohibits tampering with
evidence, and Rule 3.5, which protects against improper influence of judges and jurors."
G. Hazard & W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 393 (1985).
51. MR 3.6 does not expressly limit the no comment proscription to lawyers involved
in the case-the rule simply states: "A lawyer shall not .... ." Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct Rule 3.6(a) (1987), reprinted in Appendix II. The DR 7-107 proscrip-
tions are limited to "a lawyer participating in or associated with" or "a lawyer or law firm
associated with" the handling of a criminal case. Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility DR 7-107(A),(B) (1981), reprinted in Appendix I. Unless read with an implicit
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know that [the comment] will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding" and when the reasonable
speaker would "expect" the comment to be publicized. Rule 3.6(b) lists
six types of statements that "ordinarily" would have such an effect. 52
The six categories are similar to those in DR 7-107(B), although the lat-
ter are prescriptive and the former are at most presumptive. Rule 3.6(c)
lists seven types of statements that may be made without elaboration, and
they track the list found in DR 7-107(C).
There are several major differences between the 1969 and 1983 formu-
lations. First, the degree of potential harm in MR 3.6 is phrased as "sub-
stantial likelihood," as opposed to the "reasonable likelihood" test that
appears in portions of DR 7-107;13 while the "reasonable likelihood" test
appears only in some portions of DR 7-107, the "substantial likelihood"
test appears to apply to all stages of a criminal prosecution. Second, MR
3.6 contains a scienter element--"the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know" that the statement will pose the threatened harm. Third, the prej-
udice standard is phrased more strongly in MR 3.6--"materially preju-
dicing." Fourth, unlike DR 7-107, MR 3.6 does not specify different
phases of criminal investigation and prosecution." Finally, as the com-
ment to MR 3.6 notes, the rule "transforms the particulars in DR 7-107
into an illustrative compilation that gives fair notice of conduct ordina-
rily posing unacceptable dangers to the fair administration of justice. ' 55
The Model Rules appear to confirm the generally accepted view of the
limitation to lawyers commenting on their own cases, MR 3.6 plainly is overbroad. Ref-
erence in the comment to MR 3.6 to the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free
Press does not provide the basis for a narrow interpretation in that Standard 8-1.1 con-
tains the same broad language. Professor Wolfram suggests this results from either a
drafting oversight or an assumption that only a lawyer involved in a case would be able to
meet the requirement that a lawyer know that the statement will have a substantial likeli-
hood of material prejudice to the proceeding. See C. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 634
n.2 (1986).
52. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 (1987), reprinted in AppendixII.
53. Compare Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(B) (1981) (adopt-
ing reasonable likelihood standard) with Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
3.6(a) (1987) (statement not prohibited unless attorney knows or should know of "sub-
stantial likelihood" of prejudice). But see Note, A Constitutional Assessment of Court
Rules RestrictingLawyer Comment on Pending Litigation, 65 Comell L. Rev. 1106, 1118-
20 (1980) (no significant difference between "serious and imminent threat" and "reason-
able likelihood" tests).
54. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6 (1987), reprinted in Appendix 11.
55. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6 model code comparison (1987). Model
Rule 3.6 also omits the language of DR 7-107(C)(7), which provides that a lawyer may
reveal "[a]t the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other than a
confession, admission, or statement." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-
107(C)(7) (1981), reprinted in Appendix I. As the comment points out, "[s]uch revela-
tions may be substantially prejudicial and are frequently the subject of pretrial suppres-
sion motions, which, if successful, may be circumvented by prior disclosure to the press."
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 model code comparison (1987). MR
3.6(b) added to the no comment list references to inadmissible information that would
substantially risk causing prejudice if disclosed as well as statements that defendant has
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relative potency of extrajudicial prosecutor statements. Model Rule
3.8(e) requires prosecutors to exercise reasonable care to ensure that law
enforcement personnel do not make extrajudicial comments that the
prosecutor is prohibited from making by MR 3.6.56 No similar responsi-
bility is imposed expressly on other lawyers. Neither DR 7-107 nor MR
3.6 distinguishes between extrajudicial statements by prosecutors and ex-
trajudicial statements by defense counsel. Proscriptions in both rules
concerning disclosure of the accused's confessions or admissions and
other information, however, clearly are directed at prosecutors. Neither
rule draws any distinctions based on whether a case is tried to a judge
rather than a jury.
B. Court Rules
Most federal district courts adopted rules proscribing broad categories
of statements presumed to be highly prejudicial to a criminal defendant.
For example, the categories include all statements about the accused's
prior criminal record or any confessions or admissions.57 In 1980 Judge
Collins J. Seitz chaired a committee to review the free press and fair trial
issue; the committee issued a revised set of guidelines, including a recom-
mended rule concerning release of information by attorneys in criminal
cases ("Seitz Report")."
The recommended rule is similar to DR 7-107 and adopts the test of
reasonable likelihood of interference with fair trial as a prerequisite to
restrictions on extrajudicial lawyer speech. 9 Unlike DR 7-107, however,
the rule eliminates any restraint on comment pending sentencing and
strictly limits comment during the grand jury phase. Most federal dis-
trict courts have adopted some form of this rule.1
C. Judicial Restraints
The other major form of regulation of extrajudicial lawyer speech is
the restraining order that enjoins a lawyer from commenting publicly on
a pending case. In crafting such orders, courts often have relied on pre-
existing no-comment rules modeled on the ABA disciplinary rules rather
been charged without reference to the presumption of innocence. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.6 (1987), reprinted in Appendix II
56. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8(e) (1987)
57. This action was taken in response to the 1969 report of a committee headed by
Judge Irving Kaufman. See Kaufman Report, supra note 37, at 392.
58. See Revised Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the
Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 87 F.R.D. 519, 525-28 (1980) [herein-
after Seitz Report].
59. See id. at 525.
60. Courts in the Seventh Circuit, however, are bound by the decision in Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912(1976), which held that the First Amendment demands a "serious and imminent" threat
to a fair trial as opposed to a "reasonable likelihood" of threat to justify regulation of
lawyer comment. See id. at 257; infra text accompanying notes 199-207.
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than fashioning ad hoe no-comment rules.61 Nonetheless, the Seitz Re-
port62 recommended that each district court adopt a rule providing for
issuance of a restraining order in "a widely publicized or sensational
criminal case."'6  Some district courts have followed this
recommendation.'
Court orders restraining lawyer speech are prior restraints and courts
have recognized that the first amendment is a significant barrier to such
orders.6 Accordingly, orders restraining lawyers have been upheld only
if less restrictive alternatives were not available, the order was specific
and clear, and the speech posed either a reasonable likelihood of or seri-
ous and imminent threat to the fair administration of justice. 6
II. THE CoNTEXT OF EXTRAJUDICiAL PROSECUTOR SPEECH
The[] expressly guaranteed freedoms [of the first amendment] share a
common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on mat-
ters relating to the functioning of government. Plainly it would be dif-
ficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and
importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are
conducted .... 67
We have always held that the atmosphere essential to the preservation
of a fair trial-the most fundamental of all freedoms-must be main-
tained at all costs
68
Context is critical to first amendment analysis of prosecutor speech
restraints.69 Beyond the unique circumstances of a particular case, the
pertinent common conditions of prosecutor speech are complex.
Although attempting to capture basic features risks underinclusiveness,
this section defines four broad categories of basic features. The first con-
sists of interests that may be at stake when the state regulates extrajudi-
cial prosecutor speech. The second category of features reviews the role
of the prosecutor. The third category canvasses the relationships of the
prosecutor with others in the criminal justice system and with the press
as they bear on extrajudicial speech. The fourth category addresses vari-
ous aspects of the regulatory context-the role of the judiciary, the audi-
61. See B. Gershman, Prosecutorial Misconduct § 6.3(h), at 6-10 to 6-11 (1989).
62. Seitz Report, supra note 58, at 519.
63. Id. at 529.
64. See, ag., United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
Local Rule 121.
65. See L. Tribe, supra note 11, § 12-34.
66. Compare Levine v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d
590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985) (employing serious and imminent threat standard), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1158 (1986) with United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.) (hold-
ing that reasonable likelihood of prejudice suffices), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
67. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980).
68. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
69. Justice Holmes wrote that "the character of every act depends upon the circum-
stances in which it is done." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes,
J.).
[Vol. 58
PROSECUTION AND THE PRESS
ence of primary concern, the timing of the speech, and the problem of
predicting or determining the impact of the speech.
A. The Competing Values: Free Speech, Fair Trial,
and Other Concerns
1. Nature of the Speech and Free Expression Values
Prosecutor speech on a pending case may address countless aspects of
the criminal justice process, a subject of profound public concern. 0 Such
statements often touch upon alleged criminal activity, law enforcement,
and judicial administration. Many individuals with public responsibili-
ties in these areas-judges, prosecutors, sheriffs, police chiefs-are
elected or hold office through political appointment. Their speech is in-
extricably tied to the self-government ideal of the first amendment,71
"'the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.' 72
Protecting such speech serves the first amendment's "core purpose of as-
suring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government. '73  The general audience for such speech has a first
amendment interest in receiving it.74 The speech may be exaggerated,
sensational, unfair, vindictive, and only marginally relevant to the crimi-
nal justice system, but it is information about events having legal conse-
quences, 75 and accordingly, relates to a "matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community."'76
70. The Supreme Court has stressed repeatedly that "[t]he operations of the courts
and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern." Landmark
Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109
S. Ct. 2603, 2611 (1989) (article about a violent crime that had been reported to authori-
ties was "a matter of paramount public import"); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,218-20
(1966) (discussing importance of free information about government).
71. See A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1960); A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its
Relation to Self.Governmentpassim (1948). Even in its narrowest form the public issues
category as the core first amendment value seems to embrace prosecutor speech about a
pending case. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
L.J. 1, 24-29 (1971).
72. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1978)).
73. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). The Supreme
Court has declared repeatedly that speech on "'matters of public concern!" is "at the
heart of the First Amendment's protection." First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940)).
74. See M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech: A Treatise on the Theory of the
First Amendment § 1.02(F)(1), at 1-20 to 1-22 (1984).
75. A corollary to the informing function of prosecutor speech is that its restriction
may create an information vacuum that might be filled by less informative or responsible
sources. See Younger, Fair Trial, Free Press and the Man in the Middle, 56 A.B.A. I.
127, 128-29 (1970).
76. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). Extrajudicial prosecutor speech
should not generally become ensnared in the threshold issue in cases involving employer
regulation of public employee speech, specifically whether the speech is a matter of public
concern. See Note, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace. A Comment on the Pub-
lic Concern Requirement, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 1109, 1121-28 (1988). Speech about any as-
pect of governmental affairs generally has been considered a matter of public concern.
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In Bridges v. California,7 the leading first amendment decision con-
cerning out-of-court criticism of the judicial process, the Supreme Court
stated, "[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although
not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. 7 8 Prosecu-
tor speech may serve a safety valve function through expression of griev-
ances and perceived wrongs that, if left unexpressed, could fester and
grow 7 9 Although defense counsel speech may more commonly chal-
lenge official actions, prosecutor speech also may serve what Professor
Blasi identified as "the checking value"; that is, speech "checking the
abuse of power by public officials." 8 Extrajudicial prosecutor statements
may also support the familiar principle that speech promotes the discov-
ery of truth.81
The Court has been receptive to a range of values protected by the first
amendment,82 and first amendment scholarship offers a rich debate about
an array of free speech values."3 Whether one examines prosecutor
speech from the perspective of the self-governance ideal, the checking or
safety valve functions, the marketplace of ideas, the "self-fulfillment" of
the speaker," or the "autonomy of the listener,"8" there is no reason
based on the general nature of the speech to conclude that the first
amendment interest in protecting prosecutor expression is diminished.
Prosecutors do not lose their first amendment protections because they
are prosecutors or because their speech is based on information they have
See, eg., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Mills V.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
77. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
78. Id at 270 (footnote omitted).
79. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970); M. Nimmer, supra note 74,
§ 1.04, at 1-53, 1-54.
80. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found. Res.
J. 521, 527.
81. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); J.S. Mill, On Liberty 21-42 (G.
Himmelfarb ed. 1974) (London 1859); 1. Milton, Areopagitica, reprinted in Areopagitica
and of Education 1-57 (G. Sabine ed. 1951) (1644).
82. The Supreme Court, in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), ex-
pressed the range of protections when it stated:
It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First Amendment "was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." . . . But our cases have
never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic,
literary, or ethical matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of labels-is not enti-
tled to full First Amendment protection.
Id. at 231 (citations omitted).
83. See generally C. Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1989); F.
Schaner, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (1982); Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifi.
cations, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 119 (1989).
84. See T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6 (1970).
85. See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204, 215-18
(1972).
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obtained by virtue of their public responsibilities . 6 It is well settled that
"litigants do not 'surrender their First Amendment rights at the court-
house door"', and that attorneys retain first amendment rights despite
their positions as officers of the court."8 The Supreme Court has made
clear that first amendment expression made possible by the government
generally cannot be restricted by the government.8 9
In particular circumstances, however, first amendment rights may be
subordinated to dominant government interests in regulation. Therefore,
while recognizing that the speech in question is entitled to undiminished
first amendment protection,9° it becomes necessary to focus on the nature
of the governmental interests.
2. Constitutional Protections for the Accused
First amendment issues arise from conflicts between free speech and
other interests. For example, the issue in the defamation area ensues
from the clash between free speech values and the state interest in pro-
tecting reputation. 91 The competing interests involved in prosecutor
speech differ from other speech contexts because there is potential con-
flict between interests based on constitutional rights. On one hand, there
is the right of free speech; on the other, the "no less precious" due pro-
cess right of the accused to the fair and impartial administration of jus-
tice.9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has referred to the defendant's right to
fair trial as "the most fundamental of all freedoms." 93 Accordingly, as
the basis for regulating extrajudicial lawyer comment, the state interest
in safeguarding the defendant's right to fair and impartial adjudication is
especially strong. Moreover, because this constitutional right protects
86. Prosecutor speech may, of course, be based on information that is or can be made
available to the public.
87. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,32 n.18 (1984) (quoting In re Halkin,
598 F.2d 176, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
88. See Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
89. See, eg., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364,402 (1984) (government
contributions to noncommercial educational stations could not be conditioned upon pro-
hibition of stations' editorial speech, even if such were speech made possible by those
contributions); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (even if
local government builds municipal auditorium that makes possible the exercise of first
amendment rights associated with theatrical productions, availability of auditorium must
be "bounded by precise and clear standards," since "the danger of censorship and of
abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have
unbridled discretion over a forum's use").
90. See American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice Relating
to Fair Trial and Free Press, Standard 8-1.1, Commentary at 8-9 (1980).
91. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974), cer denied, 459 U.S.
1226 (1983).
92. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1941) (Frankfurter, 3., dissenting).
93. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). But see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) ("The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign
priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as
superior to the other... [1it is not for us to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking
what they declined to do.").
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the accused, its reconciliation with lawyer speech rights suggests that
prosecutors may be subjected to more stringent restraints than defense
counsel.94
Pretrial publicity can endanger other constitutional rights of the ac-
cused. For example, if a court employs a continuance to blunt any preju-
dicial effect of pretrial publicity, the defendant's sixth amendment speedy
trial guarantee may be compromised."5 Change of venue could prevent
the accused from exercising the constitutional guarantee of being tried in
the jurisdiction in which the alleged crime was committed. 96 The right
to a fair trial, however, is the primary competing interest based on the
accused's constitutional protections.
3. Fair and Efficient Administration of Justice
The state has interests independent of protecting defendants' fair trial
rights. 97 For example, the Supreme Court has identified "disorderly and
unfair administration of justice" as a basis to restrict speech about pend-
ing litigation because "trials are not like elections, to be won through the
use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper."9" In Wood v.
Georgia,99 the Supreme Court declared, "We start with the premise that
the right of the courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way
lies at the foundation of our system of government."1 "0 In short, the
state has a substantial interest in affording a fair and efficient trial to both
94. See Levine v. United States Dist. Court for C. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 602
(9th Cir. 1985) (Sneed, J., concurring), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
95. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 367 (4th Cir. 1979); see also Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1972) ("defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right is
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether defendant is being deprived
of [that] right").
96. Indeed, in federal courts and many state jurisdictions, change of venue is limited
if against the defendant's wishes. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Utah Const., Art. I § 12.
97. Although public justice and judicial efficiency may not be as compelling as an
accused's right to a fair trial, because "[tihe Sixth Amendment speaks only of the right of
an accused and the Fifth Amendment only of the right of persons and not of the Govern-
ment," Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), the fair administration of justice is indisputably an impor-
tant governmental interest. Indeed, the Bauer court concluded that "public justice is no
less important than an accused's right to a fair trial." Id. The debate over which interest
is more important should not significantly affect the constitutional protection of prosecu-
tor speech rights because both interests are at stake.
98. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941). Nonetheless, it cannot be as-
sumed that the speech actually threatens to jeopardize the proceedings. It must be deter-
mined the extent to which unfair administration of justice is "a likely consequence, and
whether the degree of likelihood [is] sufficient to justify summary punishment." Id.; see
also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (" 'substantive evil"' state may
prevent is "'disorderly and unfair administration of justice' ") (quoting Bridges v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941)).
99. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
100. Id. at 383. The Wood Court recognized the state interest in measures to prevent
"prejudice [that] might result to one litigant or the other by ill-considered misconduct
aimed at influencing the outcome of a trial or a grand jury proceeding." Id. at 389.
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the prosecution and the defense.10'
Part of the institutional context of prosecutor speech is the adversary
balance reflected in the rules of procedure and evidence. Use of extraju-
dicial publicity to gain advantage at trial, a possible prosecutorial motive
and a likely effect, may interfere with that aspect of the criminal justice
process." 2 Protecting the integrity of the adversarial criminal litigation
process from external influences is a state concern complementary to but
independent of the interest in protecting the individual rights of the ac-
cused.' 0 3 Both prosecutor and defense counsel's speech can affect this
interest;1° when prosecutors speak, however, the state interest in guard-
ing fair trial rights of the accused and in the fair and efficient administra-
tion of justice overlap. The governmental interest in protecting the
function of the criminal justice process is similar to the recognized inter-
est of public employers in managing the workplace effectively by regulat-
ing the speech of their employees. 05
4. Public Confidence in the Judicial Process
The Court has recognized a state interest in fostering confidence in and
preventing public misunderstanding of the judicial process. Lawyer dis-
ciplinary rules, including no-comment provisions, "were adopted in or-
der to maintain absolute confidence in the integrity of the Bar."' 0 6 In
reviewing a conviction for violation of a Louisiana statute prohibiting
picketing outside a courthouse, Justice Goldberg wrote for the Court:
A State may also properly protect the judicial process from being
misjudged in the minds of the public. Suppose demonstrators paraded
and picketed for weeks with signs asking that indictments be dis-
missed, and that a judge, completely uninfluenced by these demonstra-
tions, dismissed the indictments. A State may protect against the
possibility of a conclusion by the public under these circumstances that
the judge's action was in part a product of intimidation and did not
flow only from the fair and orderly working of the judicial process.' 07
This interest embodies the public's expectation that the criminal justice
system will afford a fair trial with an impartial jury. In this regard, "the
101. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 396 U.S.
990 (1969).
102. See Swift, Restraints on Defense Publicity in Criminal Jury Cases, 1984 Utah L.
Rev. 45, 66, 98-100. The Court in Nebraska Press suggested that press publicity poses
this risk as well, but did not find it to be present there. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 n.4 (1976).
103. See Levine v. United States Dist. Court for C. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 596-97
(9th Cir. 1985). cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356,
376 (4th Cir. 1979) (Phillips, J., concurring); In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 623-24 n.4, 449
A.2d 483, 493-94 n.4 (1982).
104. See Levine, 764 F.2d at 600-01 (approving district court order requested by gov-
ernment to restrict extrajudicial speech of attorneys participating in criminal case).
105. See, ag., Pickering v. Board of Edue., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
106. State ex rel. Coburn v. Bennett, 202 Mont. 20, 655 P.2d 502, 508 (1982).
107. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 565 (1965).
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court should make a reasonable effort to provide precisely what the peo-
ple expect."108
As a basis for speech regulation, this interest, however important and
legitimate, should not be accorded substantial weight. Secrecy regarding
the administration of justice may have a detrimental effect on public con-
fidence. Indeed, in reviewing a contempt citation based on judicial criti-
cism, the Court gave little weight to the government's related interest in
respect for the judiciary: "The assumption that respect for the judiciary
can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly ap-
praises the character of American public opinion.""lco In his concurring
opinion in support of a constitutional right to attend a criminal trial,
Justice Brennan wrote that "access is essential... if trial adjudication is
to achieve the objective of maintaining public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice." 110
5. Reputation, Privacy, and Security Interests of the Accused,
Victim, and Witnesses
Certain individuals participating in a criminal prosecution, such as vic-
tims and witnesses, would prefer not to have their involvement publi-
cized. Indeed, many newspapers refrain from publishing the names of
crime victims."' The wrenching experience of participating in a prose-
cution as a rape victim or victim of another violent crime can be exacer-
bated when the crime and the victim's identity are reported to the
community. The point is not limited to violent crime; the victim of in-
vestment fraud may wish to avoid publication of this information.
Witnesses rarely have the same degree of interest in a prosecution as
the victim and yet are subject to subpoena to testify. For the most part,
they would prefer to avoid publicity. In addition to the sensitive and
private nature of information about witnesses and victims, there also may
be security concerns.
Publishing that someone has committed a crime may be devastating to
that person's reputation.112 Moreover, the nature of the crime may also
implicate the accused's privacy interests. The presumption of innocence
108. Levine v. United States Dist. Court for C. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 602 (9th
Cir. 1985) (Sneed, J., concurring), cerL denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
109. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); see also Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (state interest in maintaining professionalism of attorneys
insufficient to overcome first amendment challenge to lawyer advertising restrictions).
110. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring). In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), Chief
Justice Burger wrote that "injury to official reputation is an insufficient reason 'for re-
pressing speech that would otherwise be free.' The remaining interest sought to be pro-
tected, the institutional reputation of the courts, is entitled to no greater weight in the
constitutional scales." Id. at 841-42 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
272-73 (1964)).
111. See, eg., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2605-06 (1989) (involving inad-
vertent violation of that policy as basis for invasion of privacy claim).
112. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 14, at 613. The state has "a pervasive and
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does not shield the accused from reputational or invasion of privacy
damage and acquittal does not necessarily repair that damage.
In spite of the foregoing reputational and privacy interests, the intri-
cate web of defamation, privacy, privilege, and access law that has been
shaped by first amendment claims and defenses as well as safeguards
built into the criminal prosecution process suggests that these interests,
though important, should not be primary considerations in determining
the generally permissible scope of extrajudicial prosecutor speech based
on no-comment rules." 3 A court considering a restraining order di-
rected at extrajudicial prosecutor speech, however, should not be fore-
closed from taking victim and witness interests into account. Moreover,
both no-comment rules and restraining orders could include provisions
for cases in which publicity poses a threat to personal security." 4
B. Prosecutor Role
1. Unique Advocate
A lawyer "may take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required
to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.""' 5 In a legal system based on
party representation, the prosecutor does not represent a victim, the po-
lice, the mayor, or the governor. He represents the community, which
includes the foregoing as well as the accused. That fact has a profound
impact on his duty: "A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded proce-
dural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evi-
dence."" 6 The prosecutor's goal is not to "win a case, but that justice
strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
113. For example, the first amendment generally protects disclosure of information
about crime victims contained in public records from invasion of privacy claims. See
Florida Star, 109 S. Ct. at 2608; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496
(1975).
114. This interest would most often be pertinent to the safety of a victim or witness,
but it may extend to the defendant's security. See eg., Closed-DoorArguments Continue
Over Relocating Noriega, Boston Globe, Jan. 13, 1990, at 4, col. I (prosecutors and de-
fense counsel ordered not to disclose details of arguments given on change of venue
motion).
115. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 comment (1987).
116. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 comment (1987); see American
Bar Association, Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution
Function 19-20 (1971). The function of the prosecutor was clearly enunciated in the
following manner:
[Tihe office demands and, on sober thought the public expects, that the prose-
cutor will respect the rights of persons accused of crime .... [O]ur traditions,
embodied in the national and state constitutions, demand that the prosecutor
accord basic fairness to all persons. Because of the power he wields, we impose
on him a special duty to protect the innocent and to safeguard the rights guar-
anteed to all, including those who may be guilty.
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shall be done." 117 By contrast, defense counsel's loyalty is to the individ-
ual defendant: he must "defend his client whether he is innocent or
guilty," and "we countenance or require conduct which in many in-
stances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth."" 18
The prosecutor represents the state, which is attempting to deprive the
accused of life, liberty, or property, and the state is limited in doing so by
the requirements of due process of law.119 The prosecutor, in short, is
subject to broader duties, 120 and the Supreme Court has declared that
one of those duties is to ensure that guilt be based on the evidence
presented in court and that the defendant receive a fair trial. 1 ' When
the prosecutor speaks publicly about a pending case, he cannot separate
his representational role from his speech, and he thereby involves the
state in the extrajudicial comment. 2 ' Indeed, a prosecutor, because he is
a state actor, could be sued for violation of the accused's constitutional
fair trial right as a result of prejudicial extrajudicial comment. 23
2. Officer of the Court
Lawyers are "officers of the court" because their duty to clients must
be fused with their duty as participants in the governmental function of
protecting the judicial process from extraneous influences that impair its
fairness.'24 The lawyer's responsibilities as an officer of the court vary
depending on whether the attorney is immediately engaged in litigation.
Courts have distinguished the constitutional scope of restrictions on law-
117. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
118. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
119. See Freedman & Starwood, supra note 14, at 617.
120. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); People v. Kelley, 75 Cal.
App. 3d 672, 680, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 461 (1977).
121. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-52 (1966); see also Owens v. State,
613 P.2d 259, 263 (Alaska 1980) (noting "prosecutor's duty as an officer of the court to
guarantee all criminal defendants their constitutional rights to a fair trial").
122. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, ., dissenting).
To have the prosecutor himself feed the press with evidence that no self-re-
strained press ought to publish in anticipation of a trial is to make the State
itself through the prosecutor, who wields its power, a conscious participant in
trial by newspaper, instead of by those methods which centuries of experience
have shown to be indispensable to the fair administration of justice.
Id; see also State v. Wixon, 30 Wash. App. 63, 69, 631 P.2d 1033, 1038 (1981) ("state's
association with trial related publicity is factor to be considered" when determining
whether a defendant has been prejudiced).
123. See, eg., Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff entitled to
attempt to show that his constitutional right to fair trial in criminal prosecution was
violated by alleged news leaks from prosecutors).
124. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 1979). "The interest of the
States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary
governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 'officers of the
court.'" Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) (citations omitted).
"[A]ttorneys, as officers of the court, have a legal and ethical responsibility to safeguard
the right to a fair trial." National Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman, 116 A.D.2d 287, 291,
501 N.Y.S.2d 405, 408 (1986).
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yers who are actively participating in criminal trials and those who are
not.12  When the prosecutor secures access to information by virtue of
his participation as counsel for the state in a criminal prosecution, he
accepts a powerful responsibility to facilitate a governmental process that
has as its primary objective fair procedure and a fair decision. 126 The
prosecutor's access to sensitive information makes him a good press
source for information about a case and creates an obligation to exercise
care in disseminating information.
3. Executive Branch Employee
Although prosecutors are deemed officers of the court and have re-
sponsibilities to the judiciary as lawyers and prosecutors, they are also
executive branch officials at the federal, state and local levels. Most are
merit or career service employees and subject to the protections and
sanctions of the grievance and disciplinary systems. As in any hierarchy
that is accountable to the public and therefore concerned about how and
what information is disseminated, subordinate attorneys are subject to
discipline from their superiors for statements they make to the press.
Regulation of government employee speech has received substantial at-
tention recently from courts1 27 and commentators.1 28 Part of the context
of prosecutor speech is potential discipline by the prosecutor's em-
ployer,1 29 who has an interest in curbing speech that is disruptive to the
workplace. The impetus for such regulation may stem from the need to
ensure a fair trial to the accused and the fair administration of justice
generally, but it may be derived as much or more from management or
political considerations. The primary focus of this Article is on judicial
regulation of prosecutor speech by rule or restraining order. For this
source of speech restraint, the prosecutor is in a different position from
the court clerk, bailiff and other court personnel. The regulator is not
the prosecutor's employer and, in fact, constitutes a separate branch of
government.
125. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 666-68 (1959) (Frankfurter J., dissenting); In re
Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 633-34, 449 A.2d 483, 498-99 (1982).
126. See People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 780, 785, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (Sup. Ct.
1976) (lawyers "stand on a different footing" than the press or public because "they ac-
quire information not as general members of the public, but by virtue of their status and
employment").
127. See, eg., Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2896-2900 (1987) (government
employee did not violate first amendment in making statement on matter of public con-
cern); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (when public employees speak in work
capacity on matters of personal interest, federal courts will not review personnel decision
taken in response to employee behavior).
128. See, eg., Note, supra note 76 at 1135-46 (traditional judicial test for public em-
ployee speech should be reformulated to increase employee's first amendment rights).
129. See, eg., Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2897 (context of statement must be considered in




United States Attorneys are political appointees and many move from
that position into partisan elective politics. State attorneys general,
county attorneys, and district attorneys generally are elected and many
seek re-election or election to another office.' 3 Notable examples in-
clude Thomas E. Dewey, Rudolph W. Giuliani, Elizabeth Holtzman,
and Richard Thornburgh. 3 ' Even though the assistant attorneys who
work as prosecutors may be merit or career service employees, they work
in political offices and have pursued political careers as well. Prosecutors
are publicly accountable; their accountability is measured in part
through public information about the prosecutor's office, and about par-
ticular cases. Indeed, it is generally accepted that elected prosecutors
have an obligation to inform the community about the functioning of
their offices.132
5. Prosecutor Role and Motives
Because of their multifaceted role in the criminal justice system, prose-
cutors may have a variety of motives-some legitimate, some arguably
not-to comment outside the courtroom about their cases. The motive
may be informational-to advise the press and the public about the na-
ture and status of the case 133 and the activities of a public law office.
This motive may be difficult to distinguish or separate from political
motivations, especially when the prosecutor or his boss is facing re-elec-
tion.'34 The political motive may be to enhance the prosecutor's image
or to promote the institutional standing of the prosecutor's office. 3- An-
other related motive is economic. Publicity may help the prosecutor se-
cure private sector legal employment and clients sometime in the
130. For example, the chief prosecutor and the trial judge in the prosecution of Dr.
Sam Sheppard were candidates for the bench in upcoming elections. See Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354 (1966).
131. See Prosecutors and Politics, A Feud Reopens the Debate on the Propriety of Such a
Match, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, at B4, col. 1.
132. See Hugel, Improving Prosecutor-Media Relations: The Key to Effectively Com-
municating Your Message to the Public, 20 The Prosecutor 37, 41 (Summer 1986).
133. Responding to an attack that he violated Justice Department no comment regula-
tions when he held news conferences as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, Rudolph Giuliani said, "I hold press conferences because the public should be
informed of the nature of the charges. As a representative of the public, it's my job."
Press-Sensitive-Prosecutors' Use of Media Hit, 71 A.B.A. J. 17, 17 (Dec. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Press-Sensitive].
134. A blatant example of this occurred in State v. Hohman, 138 Vt. 502, 420 A.2d
852 (1980), which concerned a newspaper advertisement on behalf of the state's attor-
ney's re-election campaign. In the advertisement he promised to obtain a second murder
conviction in the criminal case of State v. Hohman. The first conviction had been over-
turned on appeal. See iad at 504, 420 A.2d at 854. Upon retrial, the defendant was
convicted of manslaughter. See id.
135. See Goldstein, Odd Couple Prosecutors and the Press, Colum. Journalism Rev.
23, 26 (Jan./Feb. 1984) (recounting examples from the Hoffa and ABSCAM
prosecutions).
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future. 136 Finally, lawyers generally may seek press attention to enhance
their community status.
Attorneys may also be motivated by a desire to establish and foster a
satisfactory working relationship with the press. Giving information to a
tenacious reporter may make life easier for the prosecutor by keeping the
press at bay and by producing a favorable account of his actions. Prose-
cutors also may speak out to curry favor with other constituencies, such
as the law enforcement community, victims' rights groups, or the state
legislature.
Another possible motive is tactical and completely at odds with the
prosecutor's role. Defense lawyers especially may suspect that an over-
zealous prosecutor comments publicly to increase the probability of con-
viction by influencing prospective jurors,'37 examples of which can be
cited.13 Bad faith extrajudicial prosecutor speech may also be directed
at gaining advantage over or cooperation from defendants in plea bar-
gaining negotiations. 139
C. Working Relationships and Prosecutor Speech
1. Prosecutor and Press
Strong pressures bring prosecutors and journalists together. Pulitzer
Prize winning journalist and lawyer Clark R. Mollenhoff posits that the
prosecutor cannot ignore the press: "The public's perception of how he
is doing his job can have a significant impact on crime and criminals and
on public support of law enforcement."'" By limiting public statements
to the courtroom, a prosecutor risks being misunderstood, ignored or un-
fairly portrayed by defense counsel. 4 ' Another commentator who has
served as both a journalist and prosecutor observed that "whether we
[prosecutors] like it or not, the news media is the conduit through which
we must communicate with the public." Because the public's knowledge
of the criminal justice system comes almost exclusively through the
press, television programs, and motion pictures, prosecutors must "take
every opportunity to communicate their position on important issues af-
136. One former Assistant U.S. Attorney identified publicity as a case referral aid:
"[p]ublicity will help a lawyer get business." Press-Sensitive, supra note 133, at 18.
137. See J. Lawless, Prosecutorial Misconduct 194 (1985).
138. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Anderson, 294 Pa. Super. 1, 11, 439 A.2d 720, 725
(1981) (prosecutor attempted to influence criminal trial through extrajudicial statements
to the press). The trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the kidnapping and murder of the
Lindbergh baby featured organized campaigns by prosecuting attorneys to influence the
public through the media both before and during the trial. See Hallam, Some Object
Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 453, 460 (1940).
139. See Protess, Did the Press Play Prosecutor in Covering an FBI Sting?, Colum.
Journalism Rev. 37, 40 (July/August 1989).
140. Mollenhoff, Prosecutors and the Press, Remarks at a meeting of the Iowa Attor-
ney General's Law Enforcement Association at Lake Okabosha, Iowa (June 8, 1981) (on
file at Fordham Law Review office).
141. See id. at 4-5.
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fecting the criminal justice system to the public."' 42
For the press, the prosecutor can be the best source of information
concerning a criminal investigation and prosecution.143 He has access to
the government's evidence, including witnesses. He is trained and exper-
ienced in explaining the steps in the process and putting issues in context.
Especially during the investigation and pretrial phases, a journalist might
find it difficult to obtain information about a case from other sources.
The prosecutor interacts with law enforcement personnel, judges, court
employees, defense counsel, corrections officials, social service agencies,
and interested citizens. These contacts put the prosecutor in a unique
position to comment on the case. Indeed, reporters have argued success-
fully that they have a first amendment news-gathering interest in having
a prosecutor source unencumbered by speech restraints. 144
The prosecutor-press relationship can range from friendly to antago-
nistic, arm's length to social, trusting to suspicious, and can involve other
features that render the interaction subtle and complex. Press-prosecu-
tor communication can occur in a press conference, chance meeting, of-
fice interview, or telephone conversation. Prosecutors and journalists
can, but do not necessarily, have one-case encounters. The working rela-
tionship can extend for a long period on one case or involve numerous
cases and other issues. Prosecutors and journalists know the prosecu-
tor's office is a political one and that press coverage can affect the credi-
bility of the office and the attorneys. With recurring contact, mutual
understanding can develop about the manner in which information is
provided and used. 45 Nonetheless, the fact that prosecutors are under
legal and ethical restrictions not to release certain information about
ongoing investigations and untried charges is not well understood by the
press and can place prosecutors and reporters at odds. 14
Though a prime source, the prosecutor is rarely the reporter's only
source regarding a case and may at times serve only to confirm informa-
tion obtained from others. Prosecutor speech, therefore, often becomes
mixed in with information from many other sources that is disseminated
to the public, which compounds the difficulty of assessing the impact of
the prosecutor speech. Moreover, what a prosecutor says and what is
reported may be different. 47 As in other areas of press interest, prosecu-
142. Hugel, supra note 132, at 37.
143. It is well-established that reporters get most of their crime news from law enforce-
ment sources. See R. Drechsel, News Making in the Trial Courts 53, 94, 101 (1983).
144. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
145. For example, favorable portrayal of prosecutors may result in reporters receiving
credit for scoops. See Goldstein, supra note 135, at 25.
146. See Hugel, supra note 132, at 38.
147. This complicates application of no comment rules. "An obvious difficulty with
DR 7-107 is the relationship between what the lawyer says and what appears in the pub-
lic media. The disciplinary rule holds a lawyer responsible for what he or she actually
says 'for public communication,' even though it is the subsequent publication that threat-
ens the prejudicial effect." In re Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 128, 673 P.2d 855, 859 (1983).
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tors often serve as confidential or "off the record" sources,14 which natu-
rally hampers enforcement of lawyer no-comment rules.'49 A prosecutor
could also evade no-comment rules by putting information intended for
press dissemination in a court document-a motion or pretrial brief-
and filing it with the court. 50 Unless the defense can secure an order
sealing the document, it is fair game for press review.1 '
Finally, the information can flow in both directions. Investigative re-
porting has led to prosecution, as the Watergate scandal dramatically
illustrated.' This may be the result of collaboration between reporters
and law enforcement officials, or published stories alone may stimulate
criminal investigations. 5 3 Collaboration can take many forms. For ex-
ample, to protect confidential sources, the reporter may resist supplying
information that would aid a criminal prosecution.'54 But even when a
reporter is trying to protect a confidential source, that reporter may be
working in association with the prosecutor's office in supplying
information. 55
2. Relations with Victims, Witnesses, Law Enforcement Officials, and
Defense Counsel
The prosecutor normally has direct contact with all participants in a
criminal prosecution, which makes him an excellent press source. His
working relationship with the other participants can render them con-
duits of information to the press. For example, a law enforcement official
who has investigated criminal activity and who will be a prospective wit-
ness may be an attractive press source. He also works with the prosecu-
tor at various stages of the prosecution. He could divulge, with or
without the prosecutor's blessing, information that includes statements
by the prosecutor. Moreover, the prosecutor knows that the law enforce-
ment officer is or may be a prime target for press inquiry. For this rea-
148. See J. Lawless, Prosecutorial Misconduct 190 (1985).
149. This gives rise to the question of whether a court can require a news reporter to
disclose the identity of an individual who provided information in violation of a restraint
on publicity. See Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 469 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding such
authority), cert denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
150. In one such case, a New York court stated in dictum that a prosecutor's acts of
publicly identifying an uncharged suspect on papers filed with the court were irresponsi-
ble and unethical. See In re Death of Manners, 143 Misc. 2d 945, 949, 542 N.Y.S.2d 485,
488 (Suffolk Co. Ct. 1989).
151. See ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op.
1345 (Sept. 6, 1975) (positing that public officials should refrain from using prejudicial
language in pleadings).
152. See C. Bernstein & R. Woodward, All the President's Men (1975).
153. See Goldstein, supra note 135, at 23-24. The appropriate extent of cooperation
between the press and law enforcement has been a topic of debate among representatives
of both groups. See id. at 23-25.
154. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-81 (1972).
155. See, eg., In re Farber, 78 N.L 259, 267 394 A.2d 330, 339 (reporter charged with
contempt for failing to turn over documents from his investigation that contributed to a
criminal prosecution), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
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son, MR 3.8 imposes upon the prosecutor the responsibility to prevent
law enforcement officials and others associated with a prosecution from
making public comments that are proscribed for the prosecutor under
MR 3.6.
Similar points can be made about victims, witnesses, and defense coun-
sel, although the working relationship with the prosecutor varies in each
instance, including the prosecutor's ability to manage press contact.
Through each of these participants the prosecutor could end up serving
as an indirect source for press coverage.
From the standpoint of publicity, the relationship between prosecutor
and defense counsel can be dynamic and volatile. Defense counsel justify
press statements about the case on the grounds that something must be
done to counter coverage of the arrest or filing of charges or that prose-
cutors or law enforcement officials have leaked information damaging to
the accused. Statements from one side may prompt press pressure on the
other side for a response. The publicity can escalate based on an oppo-
nent's perceived attempts to manipulate the press. 156 Conversely, a re-
strained response to press inquiries may quiet the other side.
D. Regulatory Context: The Role of the Court, the Audience of
Primary Concern, the Timing of the Speech, and the Problem
of Assessing Prejudice
1. Role of the Trial Judge
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,"5 7 the Supreme Court placed on the trial
judge the burden of ensuring that press coverage does not compromise
the fairness of the proceeding: "The courts must take such steps by rule
and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
interferences."' 58 To meet this duty, trial judges should consider contin-
156. See In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 605 (2d Cir.) ("prosecutors, defend-
ants, and defense counsel participated in the escalating publicity duels"), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 377 (1988). "Although not a new technique, attempts to influence the outcome of
criminal trials through favorable media coverage have been utilized to an unprecedented
degree in recent years." Hugel, supra note 132, at 38. Professor Arthur Miller of
Harvard Law School recently commented that both prosecution and defense attempt to
manipulate the press. See Nightline: The Media and Fair Trials (ABC Television Broad-
cast, Jan. 23, 1990) (transcript produced by Journal Graphics, Inc.).
157. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
158. Idt at 363. Indeed, the prevailing view long before Sheppard was that control of
prejudicial publicity must be the responsibility of a vigilant trial judge and other public
officers subject to the control of the court. This was the consensus following the perva-
sive publicity attendant to the trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the abduction and murder of
the Lindbergh infant. See Hallani, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials,
24 Minn. L. Rev. 453 (1940); Hudon, Freedom of the Press Versus Fair Trial. The Rem-
edy Lies with the Courts, I Val. U.L. Rev. 8, 12-14 (1966); Lippmann, The Lindbergh
Case in Its Relation to American Newspapers, in Problems of Journalism 154-56 (1936);
see also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 549 (1976) (noting that atmosphere
at Hauptmann trial "could have been controlled by a vigilant trial judge and by other
public officers subject to the control of the court"). The Court reaffirmed this view in
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981). "Trial courts must be especially vigilant
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uance, change of venue, jury sequestration, or granting a new trial. The
Sheppard Court stated that the trial court "should have made some effort
to control the release of leads, information, and gossip to the press by...
counsel for both sides,'1s9 and recommended the gagging of trial partici-
pants "where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news...
will prevent a fair trial."'" The Court declared that new trials should be
ordered when publicity has prejudiced the fairness of a trial, but it
stressed that "reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception."' 61
A decade later, the Court again emphasized the trial judge's "major
responsibility" for acting "to mitigate the effects of pretrial publicity." 162
If judges take their cue from Sheppard, they should understand their role
is to be the guardians against the taint of prejudicial publicity. The cases
indicate that judges take this function seriously. 63
2. Prospective and Actual Factfinders as the Audience
of Primary Concern
The primary aim of limiting lawyer speech about pending cases is to
insulate the factflnder from influences other than evidence and argument
presented in the courtroom. 16 Lawyers cannot communicate with jurors
outside the courtroom before or during trial and advocate the case. Why
should they be able to advocate a case publicly when jurors or prospec-
tive jurors might hear them?
The circumstances of lawyer speech change significantly once jury se-
lection begins. Before that point, the factfnder is either the trial judge or
a collection of unknown individuals who are citizens of the court's juris-
diction, who will be selected for jury duty and to serve on the trial jury,
and who may pay attention to and remember press reports about the
case. Because the pool of potential jurors is large, restrictions on lawyer
comment cannot be tailored to avoid the ultimate factfinder and yet
to guard against any impairment of the defendant's right to a verdict based solely upon
the evidence and the relevant law." Idk
159. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 359. "Mhe trial court might well have proscribed extraju-
dicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudi-
cial matters.... ." Id. at 361. The Court said that "[e]tfective control of these sources" is
"concededly within the court's power." Id
160. Id. at 363; accord State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 32, 524 A.2d 130, 139 (1987).
161. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
162. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 (1976).
163. See, eg., Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 597 (9th Cir. 1985)
(upholding restraining order prohibiting attorneys from communicating with media be-
cause publicity posed "a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice"),
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). State appellate courts have encouraged trial courts to
employ the publicity precautions set forth in Sheppard. See, eg., Commonwealth v.
Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 200, 303 A.2d 209, 215 (prohibiting policemen and district attorneys
from releasing certain information to news media), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
164. It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant's right to a fair jury trial requires that he




reach everyone else. 6 ' Experienced criminal trial attorneys have re-
ported that many prospective jurors do not pay attention to pretrial pub-
licity and otherwise do not recall the content of the publicity by the time
of trial.166 This anecdotal information no doubt varies with the type of
case, the size and nature of the community, and the efficacy of voir
dire. 67 Once jury selection has begun, the audience of primary concern
is very small. Consequently, the risks of prejudicial publicity change and
different safeguards against jury taint from publicity are available.
The factfinder might be a judge rather than a jury. Because waiver of
the jury may not occur until the eve of trial, the publicity concern about
prospective jurors may apply during the preliminary phase of judge-tried
cases. Once it is clear that there will be a bench trial, however, the con-
cern about publicity is different and diminished. Information commonly
thought highly prejudicial to impartial jury consideration-a suppressed
confession, prior criminal convictions, the possibility of a plea bargain-
is often already known to the judge. Moreover, whatever biases may ex-
ist based on position and experience, trial judges generally are considered
resistant to the influence of prejudicial publicity, 168 though not com-
pletely immune.169 This may vary depending on how judges are selected
and retained; the judge may be appointed or elected, subject to contested
or retention re-election, or enjoy life tenure. 170 The judicial role in as-
sessing publicity is different in a bench trial because the factfinder must
decide the potential impact of publicity on himself.
3. The Timing of the Statements
DR 7-107 divides the criminal proceeding into four stages. MR 3.6
does not. The audience of primary concern and the practicality of nar-
rowly tailored regulation of speech to avoid prejudicial publicity change
depending on the stage of the proceeding. At the investigatory stage, the
audience of primary concern is the potential factfinder, including any
judge who may be assigned the case and the individuals in the jury pool
who may be selected for the petit jury. At this point it is unlikely that
165. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 758 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)
("The difficulty is that such a physical separation of the audience cannot be accomplished
in the broadcast media.").
166. See Ad Hoc Report on Publicity, supra note 4, at 5 (reporting comments from
former U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani and Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz).
167. See generally Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986)("Through voir dire, cumbersome as it is in some circumstances, a court can identify
those jurors whose prior knowledge of the case would disable them from rendering an
impartial verdict.").
168. "lit is assumed that judges will ignore the public clamor or media reports and
editorials in reaching their decisions and by tradition will not respond to public commen-
tary .... " Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
169. See Ad Hoc Report on Publicity, supra note 4, at 11.
170. Cf Drechsel, Judicial Selection and Trial Judge-Journalist Interaction in 71w
States, 10 Just. Sys. J. 6 (1985) (study suggesting elected judges more likely to pay atten-
tion to press coverage of courts).
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the putative defendant, if known, could seek court assistance in re-
straining prosecutor or law enforcement statements about the case be-
cause the individual may not have the assistance of counsel or because no
case has been fied. Accordingly, the prospect of court-ordered restric-
tions on speech narrowly tailored for the circumstances is impractical
and points to the need for general rules if some restraint is necessary. On
the other hand, there will be ample opportunity to bar from the jury
venire those individuals who learned of the case.17 ' A change of venue or
continuance may also be used. Publicity immediately before or during
trial generally is considered to have greater potential for prejudice than
publicity months in advance of trial.' 72 Moreover, the chances of any
given case reaching trial at this point are remote.
The second stage of a prosecution begins at the initiation of formal
charges and ends with the commencement of trial. The defendant and
the court are then in a better posture to consider whether any restrictions
on extrajudicial lawyer comment are necessary. There is less need for
broad restrictive rules. Moreover, there continues to be opportunity to
screen out jurors arguably influenced by publicity during jury selection
or to grant a change of venue or continuance.
The third stage is jury selection and trial. At this point, the court not
only is in a position to tailor any speech restrictions; it also has some
control over the jury itself. The court may instruct the jury not to re-
ceive any news accounts of the case and, if necessary, may sequester thejury. On the other hand, once the jury has been selected, there is limited
opportunity to eliminate those jurors who receive publicity about the
case, though the selection of alternate jurors provides some flexibility.
The fourth stage is the period between disposition or trial and sentenc-
ing. The concern is the influence of publicity on the sentencer, most
often the judge.
The investigative stage provides the greatest justification for general
rules on publicity. After that, when the court has jurisdiction, there is
less need for generally applicable rules. The practical justification for
speech restrictions by rule seems to be especially weak in the pretrial
phase, when all of the antidotes to publicity are at the court's disposal.
The justifications are stronger at the third stage, however, in part because
the factfinder will hear the evidence and should not be distracted by in-
formation from extrinsic sources, no matter how relevant. In addition,
there is limited opportunity to screen out jurors without starting over.
171. See, eg., United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 59-70 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en
band) (upholding convictions in Watergate cover-up case in spite of massive pretrial pub-
licity, tone of publicity was not inflammatory and probing voir dire by trial judge permit-
ted removal from jury of those who harbored prejudice or preconception), cert denied,
431 U.S. 933 (1977).
172. See Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); United States v. Coast of Maine Lobster Co., 538 F.2d 899,
902 (1st Cir. 1976); cf. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 253 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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This discussion suggests that narrow restraining orders, when practi-
cable, are preferable to rules because they are more effective and can be
narrowly drawn even though they may have more difficulty passing first
amendment muster.
4. The Problem of Determining Potential and Actual Prejudice
Unlike defamation law, which focuses on redressing actual harm, the
challenge in the area of prosecutor speech is to prevent harm from occur-
ring. That involves an inherently speculative prediction by the speaker
or by the courts as to whether a particular communication will prevent a
fair trial. For example, pretrial prosecutor statements revealing prior
convictions of a person charged with crime may come at a time when it is
unknown whether there will be a trial, whether the defendant would re-
main silent at trial, whether the prior convictions could or would be used
to impeach the defendant if he does testify, or whether procedural tech-
niques such as change of venue and continuance would prevent preju-
dice. Finally, it is unknown whether individuals who would serve on the
jury would know of this extrajudicial comment and, if they know,
whether they could be fair and impartial factfinders based on evidence
presented in court. 73
Apart from specific information such as a criminal record or an uncon-
stitutionally coerced confession, in a highly publicized case the saturation
of the community with news about the case can be a factor in making the
prediction of whether the publicity might prevent a fair trial. 174 More-
over, the variety of information sources for the press as well as the many
ways information about a case can be disseminated compound the prob-
lem of evaluating the potential impact of publicity and render even more
difficult the task of assessing the potential impact of prosecutor
statements.
Determining possible prejudicial impact remains just as challenging af-
ter the speech has occurred. This is reflected in the practical difficulty of
measuring impact by looking at the sources and scope of the publicity,
the voir dire record, the trial record, and post-trial interviews with
jurors. 175
173. See Frasca, supra note 3, at 169 (estimating that 2 percent ofjurors are prejudiced
about criminal case as result of news coverage and retain that prejudice after passing
through trial safeguards designed to weed out potentially biased jurors).
174. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (showing of actual unfairness
unnecessary when record shows saturation publicity of the accused's pretrial confession).
175. Nonetheless, appellate courts are called upon to perform this function and neces-
sarily render decisions. In Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), the Supreme Court
affirmed a conviction and death sentence challenged on the ground that pretrial news
accounts, including the prosecutor's release of defendant's recorded confession, were al-
legedly so inflammatory as to amount to a denial of due process. The Court disapproved
of the prosecutor's conduct, but noted that the publicity had receded some six weeks
before trial, that the defendant had not moved for a change of venue, and that the confes-
sion had been found voluntary and admitted in evidence at trial. See id. at 191-93. The
Court also noted the thorough examination of jurors on voir dire and the careful review
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
In the borderline instances where it is difficult to say upon which side
the alleged offense falls, we think the specific freedom of public com-
ment should weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence
pending cases.
176
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,'77 the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he prose-
cution repeatedly made evidence available to the news media which was
never offered in the trial. Much of the 'evidence' disseminated in this
fashion was clearly inadmissible."1 8 Although the Court encouraged
use of rules to regulate extrajudicial lawyer comment about criminal
cases tried before a jury, neither Sheppard 179 nor succeeding casesim de-
cided what degree of regulation would be compatible with the first
amendment." 1 The preceding discussion attempted to identify compet-
ing interests as well as particular features of prosecutor speech and the
regulatory context that may be relevant to the constitutional analysis.
The following section suggests how the competing interests in prosecutor
speech could be balanced without unnecessary compromise. The sugges-
tions are not meant to be rigid calibrations but attempt to develop a more
refined framework to address prosecutor speech.
A. Introduction: Content Regulation of Extrajudicial Lawyer Speech
Regulation of lawyer speech about a pending case is inescapably con-
of the facts by the state courts, and held that petitioner had failed to demonstrate a denial
of due process. See id. at 193-95; see also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975)
(jurors have only vague recollections of petitioner's crime, which alone does not presump-
tively deny defendant due process); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1962)
(careful judicial questioning showed jury to be unbiased).
176. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
177. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
178. Id. at 360.
179. The Sheppard Court said that "where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudi-
cial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until
the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity." Id. at
363. This reference to remedial action, however, does not specify restrictions on speech.
The Court said earlier that the trial judge in Sheppard "might well have proscribed extra-judicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudi-
cial matters .... H"Ia at 361. The Court's reference to gagging goes beyond the holding
in Sheppard that the deluge of publicity had deprived the defendant of due process and
does not address the competing concerns involved in restraining lawyer speech.
180. One reason the Supreme Court has not addressed the merits of this issue may be
found in Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423
(1982), in which the Court held that a federal court should abstain from deciding an
attorney's first amendment challenge to a New Jersey no comment rule pursuant to
which he was being disciplined for extrajudicial statements made during a criminal trial.
See id. 429-30, 437. The Supreme Court held that the federal courts should abstain from
interfering with New Jersey's ongoing disciplinary proceeding. See id. at 437.
181. Two leading first amendment commentators recently stated that whether Model
Rule 3.6 "sufficiently respects the speech rights of attorneys remains to be seen." M.
Franklin & D. Anderson, Mass Media Law 702 (4th ed. 1990).
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tent-based182 because the speech's message may produce harm that the
government seeks to prevent. 183 Such content regulation aimed at com-
municative impact conflicts with orthodox first amendment doctrine that
"government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." '184 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court normally applies the "most exacting scrutiny" 185 to restrictions
aimed at the communicative impact of expression. Such regulation vio-
lates the first amendment unless it is "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and... narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' 186
When the government attempts to control speech to avert harm to an
important state interest, the issue is what degree of threatened harm jus-
182. The Oregon Supreme Court, commenting on DR 7-107, declared: "Unquestiona-
bly any rule that in terms directs persons not to make particular kinds of statements is
difficult to square with constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression .... ." In re
Conduct of Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 124, 673 P.2d 855, 857 (1983).
183. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev.
189, 207-17 (1983).
184. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (invalidating law which
exempted labor picketing from general ban on picketing near schools) (citations omitted).
This stands in contrast to government actions aimed at noncommunicative impact but
nonetheless having adverse effects on communicative opportunity-for example, govern-
ment restrictions against loudspeakers in residential areas. Such actions are judged by
balancing competing interests and are allowed if they do not unduly constrict the flow of
information and ideas. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574-76 (1941) (uphold-
ing ordinance requiring parade permits where official discretion was limited exclusively to
considerations of time, place, and manner).
A rule or gag order banning out-of-court statements about a case may at first glance
appear to be a time, place, and manner restriction: "Say what you have to say, but say it
only in the courtroom." It is not a time, place, and manner restriction. There are facts
that cannot be disclosed inside the courtroom that could be stated outside, and the
speaker is permitted to speak about information unrelated to the case outside the court-
room. Such a regulation is, in short, a content restriction. Cf Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (rejecting government argument that regulation forbid-
ding the wearing of armbands in school as a protest against the war was a "place" regula-
tion based on the reaction it engendered). The Rules of Professional Conduct are explicit
content restrictions. The no comment provisions refer to the "criminal record of a
party," "the possibility of a plea of guilty," "the identity or nature of physical evidence,"
and "any opinion as to the guilt or innocence." Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.6
(1987), reprinted in Appendix IL
185. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (law prohibiting disrespectful sign within
500 feet of foreign embassy is unconstitutional); see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
276 (1981).
186. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980). The Court
has recognized several narrow categories of expression, such as "fighting words" and
obscenity, that are not entitled to first amendment protection from content regulation.
These are categories of expression not representing speech within the meaning of the first
amendment because they are "no essential part of any exposition of ideas [and are] of...
slight social value as a step to truth," or because their "very utterance inflicts injury."
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 492 (1957) If the speech falls within one of the exceptions or if the compelling
state interest/least restrictive alternative test is met, the government may regulate subject
only to the barest due process scrutiny.
[Vol. 58
PROSECUTION AND THE PRESS
tifies restraint.1 8 7 How much peril must prosecutor speech pose to gov-
ernmental interests to justify the restraint or sanction of expression?
How should the burden of proving the risk of danger be allocated? Do
the answers differ depending on the timing of the speech and whether a
rule or a restraining order is involved? The answers to these questions
must take into account considerations of overbreadth and vagueness, the
role of the speaker, the audience of primary concern, the type of
factfinder, and the institutional setting of the speech.
B. Overbreadth and Vagueness
Traditionally courts have determined the constitutionality of a law as
it is applied to facts on a case-by-case basis. The first amendment over-
breadth doctrine, on the other hand, tests the constitutionality of a law in
terms of its potential applications. 18 To be invalid, a law must pose a
significant likelihood of deterring protected speech.189 A law is void if it
"does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [govern-
ment] control but ... sweeps within its ambit other activities that in
ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise" of protected first amend-
ment rights. 190 The problem with such a law is that it "'hangs over
[people's] heads like a Sword of Damocles.' That judges will ultimately
rescue those whose conduct in retrospect is held protected is not enough,
'for the value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs-not that it
drops,"' thereby deterring protected speech. 19 Although courts use the
overbreadth doctrine "sparingly and only as a last resort," 192 over-
breadth problems should be a primary concern in formulating rules and
restraining orders to regulate extrajudicial lawyer speech.
Vagueness is separate from but related to overbreadth. As a matter of
due process, a law is void if it is so vague that persons "of common intel-
ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion." 193 The vagueness doctrine has special bite in the first amendment
area because uncertain rules induce self-censorship of protected speech
187. This approach is reflected in Chaplinsky ; category of speech that "tend[s] to in-
cite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (footnote omitted).
188. "The First Amendment doctrine of substantial overbreadth is an exception to the
general rule that a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot chal-
lenge the statute on the ground that it may be unconstitutionally applied to others."
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 109 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (1989) (plurality).
189. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798-99(1984); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
190. Thorhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (voiding statute prohibiting all pick-
eting because it bans peaceful picketing protected by First Amendment). In determining
whether a statute is overbroad, a court must first determine whether the statute "reaches
a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the over-
breadth challenge must fad." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982) (footnote omitted).
191. L. Tribe, supra note 11, § 12-27, at 1023 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
192. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
193. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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and precise rules give assurance that the lawmaker has focused on recon-
ciling speech and governmental interests supporting regulation. 194 As a
result, the Supreme Court has required more specificity for rules poten-
tially applicable to first amendment speech than to other areas. 1 " The
rule should be voided unless it "conveys sufficiently definite warning as
to the proscribed conduct."' 196
Overbreadth and vagueness, though primarily doctrinal tools used by
courts in assessing the constitutionality of statutes, are useful in the anal-
ysis of regulating extrajudicial lawyer speech, in particular to determine
whether no-comment rules or restraining orders are "narrowly drawn."
A rule that a lawyer shall not comment on a pending case when that
comment threatens to prejudice a fair trial or the administration of jus-
tice is vague because it does not provide notice about what may or may
not be said. 197 A rule that a lawyer may not comment about the charac-
ter of a witness1 98 is overbroad because it includes speech that in many
cases does not threaten fair trial or judicial administration. 199 By com-
bining a threat of harm standard with specific statements, a rule offers
guidance about what should not be said and limits its application to
statements that would produce the threatened harm.
Overbreadth and vagueness concerns were central to the Seventh Cir-
cuit's analysis in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer.20 In Bauer, the
Seventh Circuit reviewed a first amendment attack on a district court's
local criminal rule governing extrajudicial lawyer speech and on DR 7-
107 (which the district court had assumed was incorporated in the
court's local rules)."'1 The local rule closely resembled the criminal pro-
ceeding portions of DR 7-107, including the "reasonable likelihood of
interference with a fair trial" standard and the division of the criminal
process into several stages.2°2 The plaintiffs contended that the "reason-
able likelihood" test was too restrictive and that the rules were vague and
overbroad.
The Seventh Circuit in Bauer went further than any court has gone in
194. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 109 n.5 (1972); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
195. See, ag., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (flag desecration statute that
subjects to criminal liability anyone who "treats contemptuously" the United States flag
is void for vagueness; the doctrine "demands a greater degree of specificity" in first
amendment as opposed to other contexts).
196. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
197. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 371 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (holding that
"other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial" is too vague) (quot-
ing Rule 7-107(D) of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility).
198. See, eg., Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(b)(1) (1987), reprinted in
Appendix IL
199. See supra text accompanying notes 99-107.
200. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cer4 denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
201. See id. at 247.
202. See id. at 261-63 (Appendix A).
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attempting to protect the extrajudicial free speech interests of lawyers.2 03
The court found that the test of "reasonable likelihood that such com-
ment will interfere with a fair trial" was too broad to meet the require-
ment of Procunier v. Martinez204 that "the limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to
the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."2 5
Although there was little explanation why "reasonable likelihood" is
more restrictive of speech than is necessary or essential to protect the
government interest in a fair trial, the court preferred a test that limits
only those comrnments which pose a "'serious and imminent threat' of
interference with a [fair trial]" as more in keeping with "objectives of
clearness, precision, and narrowness.""2 °6 The "serious and imminent
threat" test must be combined with "specific rules ... to avoid vague-
ness."' 2°7 The court proceeded to evaluate specific no-comment rules to
determine whether they posed overbreadth and vagueness problems.
20 8
203. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the local court rule was not a prior restraint
because anyone charged with violating it could challenge its constitutional validity. See
id. at 248. The court further observed, however, that the rule had features of prior re-
straints in that a violation could be punished by contempt and the full criminal proce-
dural safeguards would not necessarily be available. See id. at 248-49. Accordingly, the
court decided that the rule must receive "closer scrutiny than a legislative restriction."
Id. at 249. In Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979), the Fourth Circuit
agreed with Bauer that DR 7-107 is not a prior restraint. The rules are not a "judicial
decree, a violation of which is summarily punishable as a contempt," and "sanctions may
be imposed upon a lawyer only after charges have been filed against him, he has been
given a due process hearing and has been found guilty." Id. at 368. But see Shadid v.
Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 85, 86 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (DR 7-107(G) is an unconstitutional prior
restraint).
204. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
205. Id. at 413.
206. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 249 (quoting Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (7th
Cir. 1970)).
207. Id. at 250.
208. For example, the rules governing the investigatory stage-the district court's rule
and DR-107(A)--were held vague and overbroad for lawyers other than prosecutors and
therefore were valid for prosecutors as a presumption of a serious and imminent threat.
See id. at 252-53. The reference to "'participating in or associated with the investiga-
tion'" was too ambiguous for non-government lawyers and the no comment rules too
broad because no one knows if there will be a trial and any prejudice to the government is
too remote. Id. at 252. Moreover, non-government lawyers can act as a check on gov-
ernment abuse of the investigatory process. See id at 253.
The court generally upheld the six types of comments prohibited in DR 7-107(B) and
(C) concerning the time from arrest or the filing of charges to commencement of trial or
disposition without trial. The prohibition on communication concerning "character, rep-
utation, or prior criminal record," DR 7-107(B)(1), was thought more appropriate for
prosecutors than defense counsel but was upheld for both on the ground that the "pub-
lic's conclusion should be based on the trier of fact's conclusion." Bauer, 522 F.2d at
254.
The DR 7-107(D) provision covering jury selection and trial prohibits comment "that
relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely
to interfere with a fair trial." Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(D)
(1981), reprinted in Appendix I. The "other matters" language was found unconstitu-
tionally vague, but the rule might survive scrutiny if coupled with the "serious or immi-
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Four years later, in Hirschkop v. Snead,20 ' the Fourth Circuit reviewed
the constitutionality of DR 7-107 as adopted by the Virginia Supreme
Court and relied on vagueness and overbreadth to hold certain no-com-
ment provisions of the rule unconstitutional.210
Model Rule 3.6 attempts to meet the vagueness and overbreadth
problems by "adopt[ing] the general criteria of 'substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding' to describe impermis-
sible conduct" and by including "an illustrative compilation that gives
fair notice of conduct ordinarily posing unacceptable dangers to the fair
administration of justice. '"2 1" For the trial and sentencing phases of a
prosecution, DR 7-107 applies when the speech is "reasonably likely to
interfere with a fair trial" or "to affect the imposition of sentence.1 212
Courts have found such a "reasonable likelihood" limitation implicit in
other provisions of the rule2 3 because otherwise "one may imagine some
situations which ought not to result in the filing of [disciplinary]
charges.1214 In reviewing DR 7-107(B), for example, the New Jersey
Supreme Court observed that "[a]s a blanket prohibition, these restraints
would be unconstitutionally overbroad." It was necessary to construe
the no-comment rules as "imposing the reasonable likelihood test."21
The model no-comment rules have been drafted accordingly and inter-
preted with overbreadth and vagueness considerations in mind. How-
ever, provisions remain in Model Rule 3.6 that are open to vagueness and
overbreadth questions, such as the blanket proscription on "any opinion
nent threat" standard. Bauer, 522 F.2d at 255-56. The court rejected an argument that
this rule should not apply for cases in which a jury is sequestered because a sequestered
jury need not remain sequestered throughout a trial. See id, at 256.
209. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979).
210. As done in Bauer, the Fourth Circuit found the DR 7-107(D) language proscrib-
ing statements about "'other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
trial' "to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 370-71. The court also held
the " 'reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence"' language of DR 7-107(E) to
be void for vagueness. Id. at 372. Generally, the court found the rules "as definite as any
set of rules may be." Id. at 368. See generally Note, Restrictions on Attorneys'Extrajudi-
cial Comments on Pending Litigation-The Constitutionality of Disciplinary Rule 7-107"
Hirschkop v. Snead, 41 Ohio St. L.. 771 (1980) (discussing status of DR 7-107 in light of
Hirschkop and ABA changes, suggesting that courts will expand the restrictions cur-
rently placed on extrajudicial lawyer speech).
211. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 model code comparison (1987).
212. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(D)-(E) (1981).
213. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107(A)-(B) (1981).
214. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 1979); accord In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 299-301, 423 N.W.2d 867, 873-74
(1988).
215. In re Rachmiel, 90 N.J. 646, 656-57, 449 A.2d 505, 511 (NJ. 1982). The Mon-
tana Supreme Court refused to follow this approach. Because the regulations lacked any
degree of harm standard, DR 7-107(B) and (H) were held to be unconstitutional abridge-
ments of the first amendment; the court thought it "unwise" to imply a saving harm
standard as in cases like Hirschkop, 594 F.2d 356, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976), or Markfield v. Associa-
tion of the Bar the City of New York, 49 A.D.2d 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1975). See In re
Keller, 213 Mont. 196, 198, 693 P.2d 1211, 1214 (1984).
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as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant." '216
The same overbreadth and vagueness considerations apply to court or-
ders restricting lawyer speech. Indeed, a well-settled prerequisite for
such an order is that it be clearly and narrowly drawn. The Nebraska
Press Court found that the part of the final gag order prohibiting the
publication of "information strongly implicative" of the accused's guilt
was both too vague and too broad to survive the scrutiny required of
restraints on first amendment rights.217 The Ninth Circuit more recently
held that an order proscribing attorney statements bearing "upon the
merits to be resolved by the jury" was overbroad because it encompassed
speech that presented no danger to the administration of justice.21 8
The enforcement context of disciplinary and court rules proscribing
categories of statements is pertinent to the overbreadth analysis. Prohib-
iting statements about the accused's prior criminal record or any confes-
sions or admissions, all of which may be highly prejudicial, can be
grossly overinclusive because the risk that such publicity will taint a trial
outcome is slight. Only a small percentage of criminal cases ever go tojury trial,21 9 most jury trials generate no publicity, and much crime news
goes unnoticed.220 In addition, exposure to prejudicial information about
a case does not automatically prevent a jury from rendering an impartial
verdict, particuiarly if the prejudicial information is later admitted as evi-
216. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(b)(4) (1987), reprinted in Appen-
dix II. Would this provision apply to the Attorney General's comment that the govern-
ment's case against General Manuel Noriega is strong? See supra note 2. Another
example is the ban on a statement "that a defendant has been charged with a crime"
unless the charge is explained as an accusation and the presumption of innocence is men-
tioned. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(b)(6) (1987). The fact that a de-
fendant has been charged is a matter of public record. Incorporating a high degree of
threatened harm standard may not be sufficient to overcome overbreadth and vagueness
problems.
217. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568 (1976); see also National
Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman, 116 A.D.2d 287, 293-94, 501 N.Y.S.2d 405, 409 (1986)(finding vague and overbroad an order restraining counsel from speaking to the press on
any matters related to the criminal trial).
218. See Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 599 (9th Cir. 1985), cert
denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). Other cases have also found gag orders on trial partici-
pants to be unconstitutionally overbroad. See, ag., CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 236(6th Cir. 1975) (trial participants prohibited "from discussing in any manner whatsoever
these cases with members of the news media or the public" by court order); Chase v.
Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 1970) (trial participants prohibited from mak-
ing public statements concerning jury, witnesses, evidence, merits, and court rulings);
Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 150-51, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233-34 (1973) (gag
order overbroad in proscribing nonprejudicial statements); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d
780, 789, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203, 209-10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (order narrowed because it
covered facts already part of trial record).
219. See Frasca, supra note 3, at 164 (reviewing studies and concluding that only 10
percent of criminal cases involve jury trials).
220. See American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Stan-
dards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press 8-33 commentary (1980); see also authorities
cited supra note 3.
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dence at trial."2- For the small portion of remaining cases, less restrictive
alternatives such as change of venue, continuance, jury voir dire, admo-
nitions to the jury, and jury sequestration are available to mitigate the
adverse impact of prejudicial publicity. These points should be consid-
ered in assessing what degree of threatened harm is sufficient to over-
come overbreadth concerns about a no-comment rule.
C. The Speaker, the Audience, and the Institutional Setting
1. Speaker
Should it make any difference to the scope of first amendment protec-
tion that a prosecutor rather than the press or someone else disseminates
information about a criminal prosecution? For several reasons, the pre-
sumptive first amendment shelter against content regulation ordinarily
does not vary with the identity of the speaker. First, the first amendment
attempts to secure "the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources,"'2 2 thereby achieving "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. '2 23 Second, because the first
amendment protects the free flow of ideas and information, its guarantees
apply to the speech involved, not just to the source. In First National
Bank ofBoston v. BelIotti, 2- for example, which struck down a state ban
on corporate advocacy, the Court decided that protected speech does not
lose its constitutional shield simply because its source is a corporation.25
The Court emphasized that the first amendment interests of the potential
audience are independent of the identity of the speaker." 6 Third, one
danger of restrictions based on the status of a speaker2 27 is that they bear
221. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565, 568-69 (1976).
222. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
223. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
224. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
225. See id. at 777, 784. But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (posses-
sion in home protected; source was vendor of obscene material and hence unprotected);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307-10 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(receipt of mail protected; source was outside U.S. and hence unprotected).
226. "The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the pub-
lic does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for
the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent
political dialogue."); Young v. American Mni Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976)
(Powell, J., concurring) ("Vital to this concern [of the free speech guarantee] is the corol-
lary that there be full opportunity for everyone to receive the message."); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (first
amendment "protection... is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients
both"); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("[S]peech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.").
227. See, eg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806-
07 (1985) (upholding rule limiting participation in federal charity drive to those organiza-
tions that did not "attempt to influence the outcome of political elections or the determi-
nation of public policy").
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a disturbing resemblance to viewpoint discrimination, 22s which "is cen-
sorship in its purest form"22 9 and traditionally has been subjected to the
highest level of scrutiny.230
The first amendment aversion to speaker-based restrictions2 31 is pre-
mised on the same free speech values served by prosecutor expression.
Nonetheless, the speaker's identity is relevant to the prosecutor's speech
rights because such rights cannot be defined apart from the context in
which they are asserted. 32 The prosecutor's role in the criminal justice
system and considerations of less restrictive alternatives to blunt prejudi-
cial publicity point to a distinction between the prosecutor and the press
or the public. 233
The prosecutor's role as representative of the state is to discharge the
prosecutorial function without violating due process rights of the ac-
cused.23 4 Although Sheppard placed upon the trial judge primary re-
sponsibility for securing those rights against prejudicial publicity, the
prosecutor and other state officials share that duty with the court because
they carry out the government action that threatens the liberty of the
accused. Publicity can affect the fair administration of justice regardless
of source, but the press is not liable for this constitutional obligation.
Thus, when the prosecutor speaks publicly about a pending criminal
case, he does so with a due process limitation that does not constrain the
press or the public. 23 5
A second consideration is that restriction of prosecutor speech to limit
prejudicial publicity ordinarily impinges less on first amendment interests
228. See L. Tribe, supra note 11, § 12-3, at 803.
229. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
230. See City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984) (citing additional authority); cf Stephan, The First,4mendment and Content Dis-
crimination, 68 Va. L. Rev. 203, 233 (1982) ("any system that protects speech must insist
to the same degree on viewpoint neutrality").
231. The Court has upheld some speaker-based restrictions. See, eg., NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 611 (1980) (upholding NLRB order
prohibiting union from engaging in secondary boycott which threatened economic viabil-
ity of third parties); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284, 294-95 (1957) (upholding injunction against picketing because under state law
union's strategy of coercion amounted to an "unlawful purpose"); see also NLRB v. Fis-
sel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616 (1969) (upholding NLRB finding of unfair labor prac-
tice where management communications were cast as threat of retaliatory action and not
as prediction of "demonstrable economic consequences:); NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co.,
375 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1964) (upholding NLRB decision to set aside election where sev-
eral weeks before election company sent employees letter mentioning several new benefits;
"the danger inherent in well-timed increases is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet
glove").
232. See L. Tribe, supra note 11, § 12-26, at 1018.
233. Prosecutors should not be restrained simply because they are prosecutors but be-
cause of their official function in the criminal justice process. See In re Lasswell, 296 Or.
121, 126, 673 P.2d 855, 857 (1983) (en bane).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 115-23.
235. Some of these considerations pertain to defense counsel, though not to the same
degree. See supra text accompanying notes 115-26.
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than restraining the press or the public. Courts and committees that
have examined this issue have endorsed a focus on the source of poten-
tially prejudicial statements rather than on the publisher of those state-
ments?3 6 A rule or order attempting to restrict the press from reporting
certain information about a criminal prosecution would constitute a
more pervasive restraint on expression than rules limiting only the extra-
judicial speech of trial participants.3 The Supreme Court appeared to
embrace this view through the opinions of both Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Brennan in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,23 8 which over-
turned a trial court's publication restraint imposed on the press.239
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court stressed the trial court's
duty to use measures short of restraints on the press to mitigate prejudi-
cial publicity, and cited limits on what contending lawyers may say as
one of the alternatives. 2" In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan
concluded that "there can be no prohibition on the publication by the
press of any information pertaining to pending judicial proceedings or
the operation of the criminal justice system,"'' "4 but he also declared that
"judges may stem much of the flow of prejudicial publicity at its source,
before it is obtained by representatives of the press." 242 He said that
"attorneys have a fiduciary responsibility not to engage in public debate
that will redound to the detriment of the accused or that will obstruct the
fair administration ofjustice" and doubted that courts lack power to con-
trol lawyer speech in "appropriate cases."243
2. Audience
The same concern about speaker restrictions turning on viewpoint dis-
crimination also applies when the nature or reaction of the audience is
the basis for speech regulation.' To consider the audience irrelevant in
236. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 608-09 (2d Cir.) (discussing differ-
ence between prior restraint on publication and restraining order directed against trial
participants), cert denied, 109 S..Ct. 377 (1988); Ad Hoe Report on Publicity, supra note
4, at 7-14 (proposing amendments to DR 7-107).
237. See Zimmermann v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 764 S.W.2d 757, 763
(Tenn.) (clear and present danger standard not required for discipline of prosecutor
speech in part because of limited class of persons subject to restraint), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3160 (1989).
238. 427 U.S. 539, 553-54 (1976).
239. See id. at 570.
240. See id. at 563-64.
241. I. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 601; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) ("[R]emedial
measures [must be taken] that will prevent the prejudice at its inception.").
243. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976).
244. See Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct 1157, 1163 (1988) (regulation of speech based on
listener reaction is content regulation); L. Tribe, supra note 11, § 12-3, at 803. The Court
has considered the audience independent of the speaker in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726 (1978). In the "seven dirty words" case the Court upheld the FCC's authority
to regulate radio broadcasts which it finds "indecent but not obscene." Id. at 729. The
Court stressed the presence of unsupervised children in the listening audience and agreed
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the prosecutor speech context, however, would be to ignore the tension at
the root of the fair trial and free press conundrum. Prosecutors contact-
ing actual or prospective jurors outside the courtroom and speaking
about the case is unethical,245 may constitute jury tampering, and cer-
tainly is not protected first amendment speech.246 Prosecutors speaking
through press intermediaries to a public that includes actual or prospec-
tive jurors serve a first amendment informing function, but also risk caus-
ing the taint that direct contact could produce.247 To preserve the
informing function and avoid that taint, the Supreme Court has urged
the use of change of venue, continuance, voir dire, instructions to the
jury, and jury sequestration. These techniques are employed to shield the
factfinder from prejudicial impact regardless of the speech source.2 48
There is a parallel to the "heckler's veto" problem, which concerns
whether authorities may silence a provocative speaker or instead must
control a hostile audience when an expressive act seems likely to touch
off a violent response.249 A recurring theme in court decisions is that the
speaker cannot be silenced if his identity is the primary factor offered to
justify the conclusion that audience violence is imminent. 250 Also, the
government may not suppress otherwise protected speech if imminent
spectator violence can be prevented or curbed with reasonable crowd
control techniques. 251 Finally, if reasonable crowd control is not satis-
with the Commission's finding that the language was potentially degrading and harmful
to children. See ia at 749-50. Society has an interest in the "well-being of its youth,"
and this permits government to assist parents, who have primary responsibility for rear-
ing and educating children. Id. at 749. For example, in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), the Court rejected a civil rights claim by a student who was
disciplined after he delivered a sexually suggestive speech at a high school assembly.
As applied in the extrajudicial speech context, potential jurors would be considered the
vulnerable audience in need of some government shielding from prejudicial publicity.
245. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-108(A), (B) (1981), re-
printed in Appendix I; Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.5 (1987), reprinted in
Appendix Il.
246. Indeed, contact between the press and jurors is limited. See In re Stone, 703 P.2d
1319, 1322 (Colo. App. 1985). At least one court has held that the first amendment does
not protect reporters' communications with prospective jurors who had been admonished
not to discuss a pending case. See id. at 1321-22.
247. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 US. 447, 468 (1978) (upholding
disciplinary action against attorney who violated state's ethical rules by soliciting client
face-to-face) with In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 433-39 (1978) (invalidating disciplinary
action based on public communication to organize plaintiffs for civil rights suit as viola-
tive of first amendment).
248. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574 (1981).
249. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
250. See, eg., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1199 (7th Cir.) (striking down Skokie,
Illinois, village ordinance which prohibited granting of permit for all public demonstra-
tions that "incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward a person or group of persons
by reason of reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affliation"), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
251. See, ag., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550 (1965) (1500 demonstrators across
the street from the county courthouse and jail were separated by 75 to 80 armed police-
men from a crowd of 100 to 300 "muttering" spectators); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229, 229-31 (1963) (187 demonstrators at the state house drew a crowd of 200 to 300
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factory, the state can suppress the speech if it is the apparent cause of the
impending disorder.252 The problem with prosecutor speech is not in-
citement of violence from a hostile audience, but rather the prejudicial
publicity influencing the factfinder. The "heckler's veto" authority coun-
sels that the prosecutor should not be silenced without efforts to shield
the factfinder from the speech or to remedy the prejudicial impact of any
publicity. Further, speech restrictions must be based on a finding that
the speech is the likely cause of incurable jury taint.
Does the audience of primary concern point to different first amend-
ment protection for prosecutor speech? A prosecutor's extrajudicial
statements may receive more dissemination and attention and may have
greater influence over the audience of primary concern-the factflinder-
than comments by a mere observer of the case.2 3 Standing alone, how-
ever, the scope of dissemination and impact of the speech are relevant to
assessing potential harm in a given case but not in formulating the first
amendment standard. The interactive roles of prosecutor and jury, how-
ever, should be relevant. The latter is to decide guilt or innocence based
only on evidence presented and admitted in the courtroom. Because
prosecutors, not other out-of-court speakers, are responsible for present-
ing this evidence, there is reason for heightened concern about out-of-
court prosecutor speech concerning the case.254
When the factflnder in a criminal case is the judge rather tha]r a jury,
the fair trial and free press balance shifts. The judge rules on admissibil-
ity of evidence and therefore is aware of information that is not to be
considered in deciding guilt or innocence, regardless of whether such in-
formation is published outside the courtroom. Judges are trained and
experienced in courtroom procedure and aware that factfinding must be
based on admitted evidence. The disciplinary rules do not distinguish
between bench and jury trials, and courts have reacted differently to this
distinction. The Bauer court rejected a distinction between bench and
jury trials on the ground that the no-comment rules could prevent cer-
tain prejudicial information from ever coming to the attention of a
judge." 5 In Hirschkop, by contrast, the court held that "when it be-
apparently peaceful observers; police had been given ample warning and had 30 officers at
the scene, with adequate reinforcements available within a short time).
252. See, ag., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam) (overturning
conviction of spectator at an anti-war demonstration prosecuted for his disorderly con-
duct while being cleared from college campus: "at worst [the statement] amounted to
nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time. This is not
sufficient to permit the State to punish [his] speech."); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
316, 319-20 (1951) (affirming conviction of speaker who urged blacks to rise up in arms to
fight for equal rights while crowd of 75-80 whites and blacks began to issue threats of
violence).
253. See supra notes 14-15, 140-55 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 15; cf Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
255. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 256-57 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). However, the no comment rule for the period between
completion of trial and sentencing was struck down because a judge can consider such a
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comes apparent that the case is to be tried by a judge alone, we see no
compelling reason for restricting lawyers' comments in order to assure a
fair trial."2 6 Hirschkop cited lack of evidence that pretrial publicity has
interfered with the fairness of bench trials and noted that judges rou-
tinely become aware of evidence that is inadmissible or has no direct
bearing on guilt or innocence.2" 7 The court upheld the no-comment rule
for the sentencing phase only when a jury has responsibility for
sentencing.258
The need for general no-comment rules is diminished under these cir-
cumstances, but not absent. Judges are not necessarily immune from the
influence of publicity, especially when publicity has saturated the com-
munity and the judge is subject to the elective process.' 9 Moreover, the
Sheppard publicity management function is complicated by the judge try-
ing to determine whether he needs to protect himself from publicity.
Under these circumstances, the no-comment rules have a constitutional
basis, but the balance should more strongly favor speech. This could be
done by rejecting any presumption that prosecutor speech poses the
threatened harm2 6° and by a rule requiring a showing that the prosecutor
speech did, in fact, prejudice the judicial proceeding. The scope of pro-
tection should extend as far as those decisions holding that extrajudicial
comment cannot be punished as contempt absent a clear and present
danger that it would cause a judge to yield to public pressure.' 61
3. Institutional Setting
Institutional context has been important in court decisions upholding
speech limits in the military,262 prisons, 6  schools,'"6 and government
employment,265 but "the Court has not developed a systematic approach
wide range of factors in sentencing and because the interest in protecting judges from
public pressure runs afoul of the Supreme Court cases holding that the first amendment
precludes contempt convictions for judicial criticism. See id. at 257 (citing Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941)).
256. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 371 (4th Cir. 1979).
257. See id.
258. See id. at 372 (noting that a jury can be responsible for sentencing in Virginia).
259. Justice Douglas observed: "This pressure can be serious when judges are elected.
... Even federal judges, who have life tenure, may feel the lash of editorials demanding
that cases be decided this way or that." Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46
A.B.A. J. 840, 840 (1960).
260. The suggestion that an inference could be drawn that public criticism would influ-
ence a judge to make unfair rulings against either the accused or the state was rejected by
the Supreme Court in Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 349 (1946).
261. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1947).
262. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743
(1974).
263. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974).
264. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des
Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511-12 (1969).




for the application of First Amendment standards to the management of
government institutions." '266 The difficulty in identifying unifying princi-
ples is rooted in the diverse features of the institutions and different con-
texts of the speech at issue. Moreover, the danger in seeking rules for
each "special context" risks failing to identify and assess the competing
interests at stake in particular cases and abandoning established first
amendment principles.267 Although this Article eschews that approach
in favor of analysis that accounts for the competing values and the com-
plexity of context, the Court's decisions in some of these cases can be
instructive, especially those involving speech regulation in government
employment and civil litigation discovery.
Supreme Court decisions have attempted to balance the right of free
speech of the public employee and his listeners against the danger that
the employee's speech poses to the institutional efficiency of the govern-
mental agency that employs him. The Court has established that the first
amendment rights of government employees are not coextensive with
those of private individuals.268 The closest analogy from these cases is
when government agencies attempt to regulate employee speech that oc-
curs outside the workplace.
In Pickering v. Board of Education,269 a teacher had been fired for crit-
icizing the school board in a letter to the editor. Because the teacher's
speech neither "impeded [his] proper performance of his daily duties in
the classroom!' nor "interfered with the regular operation of the schools
generally," the Court concluded that "the interests of the school admin-
istration" in controlling the speech were "not significantly greater than
its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any member of the gen-
eral public. '270
266. Post, The Management of Speech. Discretion and Rights, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev. 169,
196.
267. See Dienes, Wien the First Amendment is Not Preferred: The Military and Other
"Special Contexts" 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 779 (1988). Professor Dienes provides examples
where the Supreme Court has suggested that first amendment values are not fully applica-
ble in the military context. See id. at 799-827.
268. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employ-
ees that differ significantly from those it possesses in [regulating] ... the speech
of the citizenry in general. The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance
between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon mat-
ters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.
Id
269. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
270. Id. at 572-73 (footnote omitted); see also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (holding that dismissal of public school teacher because of her
allegation that school's policies were racially discriminatory violates the first amend-
ment). Pickering has been criticized for inadequately protecting public employees' rights
to free speech: "Although courts have flly articulated and usually deferred to employ-
ere' interests in efficiency, they have neglected to explicate employees' interests in expres-
sion. This systematic bias has resulted in a body of law that too narrowly conceives
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Like the teacher, the prosecutor is participating in an institutional pro-
cess. Like the school board, the trial judge or the lawyer disciplinary
authority has an interest in protecting the judicial process from adverse
interference, whether the speech threatens the constitutional rights of the
accused or the administration of justice generally. Unlike the govern-
ment employee cases, however, the prosecutor is not a court employee
but is part of the executive branch. Although the prosecutor has respon-
sibilities to the court as an advocate for the community and officer of the
court, he is accountable as well to his office or the political process that
employed him.
When the Justice Department or a district attorney's office regulates or
disciplines its attorneys for speech related to employment and about a
matter of public concern, the employee's interest in free speech must be
balanced with the government employer's interest in managing the work-
place.271 The Court's cases on employer regulation of public employee
speech, though fluctuating between deference to the state as an em-
ployer272 and recognition of the public employee's right to speak on pub-
lie issues,27 3 serve as the starting point in the analysis.
Judicial regulation of prosecutor speech, either through discipline for
violation of no-comment rules or restraining orders, shares with these
cases the management interest in ensuring that the criminal justice pro-
cess operates fairly and efficiently. Moreover, the prosecutor is an officer
of the court and subject to a trial court's jurisdiction during the case.
The government interest in effective performance of an institution in
which the prosecutor is a participant is analogous to the interest of gov-
ernment employers in the public employee speech cases.
The judge-prosecutor relationship is not one of employer-employee,
however, and the prosecutor serves in a different branch of the govern-
ment than does the judge. He can, through his speech, serve a checking
function on the judicial branch and on some executive branch agencies,
such as the police.274 He has an employment loyalty and is subject to the
public employees' first amendment freedoms." Developments in the Lan-Public Em-
ployment, 97 Hare. L. Rev. 1611, 1757 (1984).
271. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 571-72.
272. See, eg., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-52 (1983) ("When close working
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to
the employer's judgment is appropriate.").
273. See, eg., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) ("Given the function of
the agency, McPherson's position in the office, and the nature of her statement, we are
not persuaded that Rankin's interest in discharging [McPherson] outweighed her rights
under the First Amendment.").
274. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am. B. Found.
Res. J. 521, 634. Professor Blasi's comment about public employee speech takes on an
even stronger checking function in this context: "Since under the checking value infor-
mation about the conduct of government is accorded the highest possible valuation,
speech critical of public officials by those persons in the best position to know what they




management authority of his office. At the same time, the prosecutor is a
participant in the criminal justice process and is subject to the direction
of a trial court with a responsibility for managing a fair and efficient
proceeding. He consequently stands in different shoes for commenting
on a pending case than do the press or the public.
This conclusion receives support and further direction from a 1984
Supreme Court decision that analyzed the constitutional rules governing
protective orders that prohibit the disclosure of information received in
civil discovery. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart2"7 involved the tension be-
tween free speech and management of pretrial discovery. The Court,
speaking through Justice Powell, held that although litigants had first
amendment interests in the dissemination of information gained through
discovery, the State's "substantial interest in preventing... abuse of its
processes" justified delegation of "broad discretion on the trial court to
decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protec-
tion is required." There was to be "no heightened First Amendment
scrutiny. 27
6
A criminal trial court's Sheppard responsibility to foster fair adjudica-
tion through a variety of management tools, including restraints on ex-
trajudicial lawyer speech, is similar to a civil trial judge's duty to manage
pretrial discovery, which may involve, as it did in Seattle Times, protec-
tive orders barring disclosure of discovery information. Extrajudicial
prosecutor speech may be based on information derived outside any dis-
covery process, and the interests in preventing disclosure of civil discov-
ery are based more on protecting the parties from harassment,
embarrassment, or commercial appropriation than on the fairness of the
litigation.2 7 7 Nonetheless, the lawyers in both instances are not em-
ployed by but are officers of the court,278 the trial court's action is taken
to facilitate the judicial process, and the restraints curb speech outside
the courtroom.
Justice Powell announced early in his Seattle Times opinion that the
constitutionality of the rule authorizing the protective order would turn
on the same test quoted in Bauer and Hirschkop and taken from
Procunier v. Martinez,279 a case dealing with the censorship of prisoners'
mail:
275. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
276. Id at 35-36. Although Justice Brennan joined Justice Powell's opinion, he also
wrote two brief concurring paragraphs in which he wasjoined by Justice Marshall. In his
concurrence, Justice Brennan said that he would affirm because plaintiffs' "interests in
privacy and religious freedom are sufficient to justify this protective order and to over-
come the protections afforded free expression by the First Amendment." Id. at 38 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
277. See Fed. P, Civ. P. 26(c) advisory committee notes.
278. If the government is a party to the civil case, an executive branch attorney is
involved. Seattle Times did not, however, suggest that the presence of a government
party or attorney would affect its analysis. See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20
(1984).
279. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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whether the "practice in question... [furthers] an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expres-
sion," and whether the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [is] no
greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved.
210
Although the Court focused on the need to prevent discovery abuse as an
"interest unrelated to suppression of expression, '28 1 the interests sup-
porting a protective order there-protection of the privacy interests of
the litigants and third parties2 2 -- were not so unrelated because the
threatened harm turned precisely on the fact that the dispute was over
the impact of disseminating discovery information.2 8 3 The first element
of Procunier similarly is not met when the state attempts to regulate pros-
ecutor speech because the governmental interest, while important and
substantial, is not unrelated to the suppression of expression.2 84 The Se-
attle Times Court further concluded, with little explanation, that sub-
stantial trial court discretion is "necessary" to protect the interest in
preventing discovery abuse.28 5
Despite these conclusory affirmations of the Procunier tests and the
Court's deference to speech restraints based on the "good cause" stan-
dard of the civil discovery rules, 2 6 the need for effective management of
the judicial process formed the basis for imposing speech limits more
readily in this than in other contexts.2 " The Court found support from
references in decisions limiting trial participant speech to protect the ac-
cused's fair trial rights. 2 8 Because the information at issue was obtained
through the use of the discovery process, the Court did not consider the
protective orders the "kind of classic prior restraint that requires exact-
ing First Amendment scrutiny.128 9 The prosecutor's sources of informa-
tion for extrajudicial speech may not derive exclusively from legal
280. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413
(1974)).
281. Id. at 34.
282. See id.
283. See la 33-34; Post, supra note 266, at 180-81 (arguing that first element of
Procunier test not met in Seattle Times).
284. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2542 (1989) (finding state interest in pre-
serving flag as symbol of nationhood related to expression in prosecution for flag
burning).
285. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 36.
286. See id. at 37.
287. See Post, supra note 266, at 201-06.
288. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 n.18. The Seattle Times Court stated that:
Although litigants do not "surrender their First Amendment rights at the
courthouse door," those rights may be subordinated to other interests that arise
in this setting. For instance, on several occasions this Court has approved re-
striction on the communications of trial participants where necessary to ensure
a fair trial for a criminal defendant.
Id. (quoting In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
289. Id. at 33.
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process, but he does have much of his information about a case because
he is a participant in that process.
4. Distinguishing the Prosecutor from the Press
The prosecutor's role as representative of the state and officer of the
court and the limits the criminal justice process prescribes for the prose-
cutor to communicate information to a jury point to a stronger justifica-
tion for limiting prosecutor speech than speech of the press and the
public.2 90 In addition, the cases about public employee speech and re-
straints on dissemination of civil discovery information illustrate a
stronger management justification to limit extrajudicial prosecutor
speech than speech of those observing and reporting on the criminal jus-
tice process.
The Court foreshadowed such a conclusion in Landmark Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Virginia.291 In Landmark, the Court held that prosecution
of a newspaper owner for publishing an article about judicial conduct
commission proceedings that were confidential under state law was a vio-
lation of the first amendment. The Court was careful to point out that it
was not addressing a constitutional challenge to a state's power to punish
participants for breach of confidentiality.292 Moreover, the Sheppard
Court, which suggested limits on extrajudicial comments by trial partici-
pants, was careful to avoid suggesting that a court could take action di-
rected against publication of whatever information the press did obtain
or whatever comments the press might choose to publish.
D. Probability of Harm Standard
The "clear and present danger" doctrine is concerned with distinguish-
ing protected advocacy from unprotected incitement of violent or illegal
conduct. Its development through landmark Supreme Court decisions
from Schenck v. United States293 in 1919 to Brandenburg v. Ohio294 in
290. The Hirschkop court stated that "courts must consider the 'special characteristics
of the ... environment' in which the speech is uttered." Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
356, 363 (4th Cir. 1979) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). The court did not elaborate on these "special characteristics,"
but did say that lawyer speech could prejudice the right to a fair criminal trial, that it is
especially difficult for a trial judge to protect this right during the investigatory stages of a
case, and that lawyers are "officers of the court" subject to special responsibilities. Id. at
364-66.
291. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
292. See id. at 837. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart drew a sharp distinction
between a state's power to punish the participants and its power to punish the press for a
breach of confidentiality. See id. at 848-49 (Stewart, J., concurring).
293. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
294. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), overruling Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927). See generally Comment, Brandenburg v. Ohio: A Speech Test For All Seasons?,
43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 151 (1975) (discussing Brandenburg standard and examining post-
Brandenburg decisions).
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1969 "lies close to the heart of the American free speech tradition." 295
Although developed in the context of subversive advocacy, the clear and
present danger doctrine has served as authority to test government regu-
lation of speech in other circumstances.296 The Supreme Court has relied
on it to determine the constitutionality of contempt citations, in the ab-
sence of a prior court order, based on out-of-court statements critical of
the administration of justice in ongoing judicial proceedings.
The leading case that defines when an extrajudicial statement becomes
a punishable attempt to interfere with the administration of justice is
Bridges v. California.2 97 In Bridges, the Court overturned a contempt
citation based on union leader Harry Bridges' public release of a telegram
he had sent the Secretary of Labor "predicting" a massive strike if a
California state court attempted to enforce its decision against Bridges'
union in a jurisdictional dispute over representation of West Coast dock
workers. A motion for new trial was pending at the time Bridges made
his telegram public. 2 98 In a companion case, Times-Mirror Co. v. Supe-
rior Court,2 99 the Court reversed a contempt conviction where The Los
Angeles Times had editorially warned a judge, while sentence was pend-
ing, against making a "serious mistake" if he granted probation to two
convictions of a Teamster's Union "goon squad."3"° Writing for the ma-
jority in both cases, Justice Black stated that, before the state could
abridge freedom of expression, the danger of prejudice to the disposition
of the pending adjudication must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high."30 1 Applying this test, the Court found that
the release of Bridges' telegram and publication of the editorial did not
present "a clear and present danger" of interference with the administra-
tion of justice.0 2
The Court uniformly has reversed contempt convictions for out-of-
court statements. In Wood v. Georgia,3 "3 a sheriff's open letter to the
press and grand jury criticizing the jury's investigation into charges of
295. H. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition 125 (J. Kalven ed. 1988). See generally Com-
ment, supra note 294, at 153-59. The Brandenburg doctrinal synthesis allows govern-
ment regulation of advocacy (1) "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action" and (2) "likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
296. "[T]he 'clear and present danger' language of the Schenck case has afforded prac-
tical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of constitutional protections
of freedom of expression was in issue." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941)
(invalidating contempt order for criticism of judge's decision in pending case). See gener-
ally Comment, supra note 294, at 153-64.
297. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
298. See id. at 275-76.
299. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
300. See id. at 272 n.17.
301. Id. at 263.
302. See Id. at 277-78. See generally R. McCloskey, The Modem Supreme Court 15
(1972) (observing that if Bridges' threat to cripple the West Coast economy did not pres-
ent clear and present danger, then almost nothing said outside of court is punishable as
contempt).
303. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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electoral corruption against his county involving bloc voting by blacks
was held to be protected speech. In Craig v. Harney,3" the Court over-
turned a newspaper's contempt conviction for criticizing an elected
county judge's mishandling of a civil case involving a veteran. In Penne-
kamp v. Florida,"' a conviction was overturned for articles critical of
local judges' reliance on "legal technicalities" to turn criminals loose.
Commenting on these cases in his opinion for the Court in New York
Times v. Sullivan,3" 6 Justice Brennan wrote that "[s]uch repression
[(criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision)] can be jus-
tified, if at all, only by a clear and present danger of the obstruction of
justice."3 7 The right to engage in out-of-court publicity concerning a
pending criminal proceeding was not absolute, but a restriction could be
justified only on a showing of a clear and present danger of actual inter-
ference with the fair adninistration of justice.
Four formulations of threatened harm have been advanced to deter-
mine whether extrajudicial lawyer speech can be regulated under no-
comment rules. First, the Seventh Circuit in Bauer held that serious and
imminent threat to the fair administration of justice is needed to accom-
modate speech interests.30 ' Second, Hirschkop, relying on general refer-
ences to fair trial rights and "officer of the court" status of lawyers, held
that the "more appropriate standard is that the publication present a rea-
sonable likelihood that it will be prejudicial to the fair administration of
justice,"3 1'- and that limitation is appropriate only to account for "ex-
traordinary circumstances [when] there is no likelihood of a prejudicial
effect." 310 In 1982 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled on the constitu-
tional scope of DR 7-107(D), which restricts attorney extrajudicial
speech in the criminal trial setting. In re Hinds3"1 arose from a discipli-
nary proceeding against a lawyer who was cooperating with a defense of
a criminal prosecution and who publicly criticized the trial judge's con-
duct of the trial. Applying the Procunier test, the court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the "reasonable likelihood" standard, citing defendant's
fair trial right and the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the
judicial process, while also stressing the "officer of the court" role of
lawyers.312
Third, one month before the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bauer, a
New York appellate court in Markfield v. Association of the Bar of the
304. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
305. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
306. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
307. Id. at 273.
308. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
309. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 1979).
310. Id. at 368.
311. 90 NJ. 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982).
312. See id. at 615-16, 449 A.2d at 489-90. See generally New Jersey Developments: In
re Hinds: New Jersey Establishes a Standard for Restricting Attorney Speech, 35 Rutgers
L. Rev. 661, 661-62 (1983).
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City of New York 313 reviewed a disciplinary action taken against an at-
torney who had participated on a radio panel discussion concerning
prison rebellions at the same time he was counsel in a criminal trial. The
court held that use of DR 7-107(D) should be restricted to those situa-
tions in which it is found that the extrajudicial statements presented a
clear and present danger to the administration of justice.314 Finally, MR
3.6 adopts the standard of substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing
an adjudicative proceeding.315
The "clear and present danger" and "serious and imminent threat"
standards have been viewed as "substantively indistinguishable. ' 316
Both were articulated in Bridges and represent the first amendment stan-
dard protecting out-of-court speech from contempt sanctions. MR 3.6's
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" is meant to approximate
the clear and present danger formulation. 311 Accordingly, the competing
standards are reasonable likelihood versus a stronger and more immedi-
ate threat.
The Supreme Court has not considered a case in which a lawyer was
cited for contempt or disciplined under a no-comment rule for extrajudi-
cial statements about a pending case.318 The Seventh Circuit in Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer31 9 found the "reasonable likelihood" test
overbroad and incompatible with the "objectives of clearness, precision,
and narrowness. ' 320 Because no-comment rules apply generally to extra-
judicial lawyer speech, their enforcement is at least a step removed from
the Sheppard trial court's fair trial management function. The rules' gen-
eral applicability calls for a high threat of harm standard to guard
against punishment of speech that otherwise should be protected in the
circumstances of a particular case. Although some courts321 and com-
313. 49 A.D.2d 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1975).
314. Id. at 517, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 85. This was the standard adopted by the ABA. See
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 8-1.1(a) (1980).
315. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 (1987), reprinted in Appendix I.
316. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Fair Trial and Free Press 8-11 (1980). The
Hinds court doubted that the clear and present danger standard provided any greater
precision or clarity than reasonable likelihood, see In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 622, 449
A.2d 483, 493 (1982), and although that test may be more narrow in its reach, the nature
of the governmental interest involved and the status and role of the attorney in effectuat-
ing that interest justified the "reasonable likelihood" test. See id. at 623-24, 449 A.2d at
494.
317. See G. Hazard & W. Hodes, supra note 50, at 395.
318. The Supreme Court recently declined to review a Tennessee Supreme Court deci-
sion upholding discipline of a prosecutor for two out-of-court statements in violation of
DR 7-107(B) and finding a "reasonably likely" test of threatened harm constitutionally
permissible. See Zimmerman v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 764 S.W.2d 757,
763 (Tenn.), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3160 (1989).
319. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
320. Id. at 249.
321. See Zimmermann, 764 S.W.2d at 763. But see Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) ("the 'reasonable likelihood' test places a lesser burden on
the defendant than the 'substantial probability' test").
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mentators- have argued that the competing formulations may in prac-
tice be distinguishable only in terms of semantic emphasis, the narrower
and arguably more protective "serious and imminent threat" or "sub-
stantial likelihood" test is the more sound constitutional starting point.
The latter appears in Model Rule 3.6.
Model Rule 3.6 needs revision or clarification, however. Instead of
calling for proof that an extrajudicial statement posed a substantial likeli-
hood of prejudice, it proscribes comment that the "lawyer knows or rea-
sonably should know... will have a substantial likelihood" of prejudice.
The rule should address both speaker knowledge and actual threat.3"
The comment to Model Rule 3.6 appears to assume that some showing of
threatened harm is required.324
E. Proving Probability of Harm
When difficulties inherent in proof reach an impasse, the law often
resorts to the procedural escape of recognizing a presumption. For ex-
ample, proof of fact A (that a prosecutor spoke publicly about a subject
proscribed by a no-comment rule) is sufficient to find fact B (that the
statement actually threatened a fair trial), and the party denying the
existence of fact B (the prosecutor) must then attempt to prove its nonex-
istence.325 In Bauer, the court thought it "proper to formulate rules
which would declare that comment concerning certain matters will pre-
sumptively be deemed a serious and imminent threat to the fair adminis-
tration of justice," even though such a "presumption is itself a serious
limitation of free speech. ' 326 In In re Rachnie,327 the New Jersey
Supreme Court reviewed disciplinary action taken against a former pros-
ecutor for public comments about whether a fourth prosecution should
be instituted against a defendant whose conviction for murder, which
Rachmiel prosecuted, had been overturned for the third time. The court
regarded the no-comment rules of DR 7-107(B)(6) as creating a rebutta-
ble presumption that statements on the proscribed topics are reasonably
likely to interfere with a fair trial, but the state would still bear the ulti-
mate burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the speech
322. See Note, supra note 53, at 1118-19.
323. Only one of MR 3.6's illustrative no comment rules contains this feature. See
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6(b)(5), reprinted in Appendix H (1987).
MR 3.6(b)(5) proscribes comment on inadmissible information that "would if disclosed
create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial." Id.
324. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 model code comparison (1987)
(comparison with Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-107). See supra note
51 for another reason there is need for a clarifying revision of MR 3.6.
325. See McCormick on Evidence § 342, at 965 (E. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
326. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975), cert,
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). The balance of the opinion was devoted to deciding whether
specific rules justified a presumption requiring the speaker to show no imminent threat to
fair trial to avoid discipline. See id. at 252-59.
327. 90 N.L 646, 449 A.2d 505 (1982).
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was reasonably likely to affect trial fairness.328 Unlike Bauer and
Rachmiel, there was no mention in Hirschkop, Markfield, or other cases
about implicit presumptions that speech violating the rules is reasonably
likely to interfere with a fair trial.329
Allocating burdens of proof in this manner can be dispositive when
fact-finding cannot resolve the issue of threat of harm.330 The creation of
a presumption is critical because of the proof problems in ascertaining
potential or actual harm. As a result, the presumption may be more sig-
nificant in assessing the accommodation of competing values than in the
verbal formulation of the degree of potential harm required to find a vio-
lation-"reasonable likelihood" as opposed to "clear and present dan-
ger" or "serious and imminent threat."
If a prosecutor speaks in violation of one of the Rule 3.6 no-comment
proscriptions, should a court presume that such speech posed a serious
threat to a fair trial? That is precisely how Rule 3.6 is framed, and the
reporter for the rules has described the list of specific no-comment rules
as '!presumptions.' 3 3 1 How could the presumption of prejudicial public-
ity be rebutted-before, during, or after trial? The speculative nature of
the determination, whether by the speaker or by the courts, that a partic-
ular communication will or did prevent a fair trial can render the deter-
mination uncertain for the speaker or the court, but the presumption will
produce a result. Nonetheless, the "power to create presumptions is not
a means of escape from constitutional restrictions.1332
Reliance on impasse alone to create a presumption is arbitrary. Pre-
sumptions are created and designed based on various factors, such as the
probability of the presumed fact, one party's superior access to proof,
and policy considerations that favor the contention receiving the benefit
of the presumption.333 The probability and policy factors apply to pre-
328. Id. at 658, 449 A.2d at 512.
329. See Note, Judicial Restrictions on Attorneys' Speech Concerning Pending Litiga-
tion: Reconciling the Rights to Fair Trial and Freedom of Speech, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 499,
510-12 (1980) (comparing different analysis of presumptive threat of lawyer speech in
Bauer and Hirschkop).
330. See generally Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77(1986) (first amendment requires private person defamation plaintiff to bear burden of
proving falsity in case about speech of public concern).
331. G. Hazard & W. Hodes, supra note 50, at 395 (emphasis in original). It is not
clear how the authors were using the term "presumptions" in a technical evidentiary
sense.
332. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911). In Landmark Communications v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), the Court reversed the conviction of a newspaper that had
violated a Virginia statute which imposed criminal sanctions on persons who breached
the confidentiality of proceedings before a commission responsible for inquiries into com-
plaints of judicial disability or misconduct. The Court declined to defer to the finding of
the Virginia legislature that the divulgence of confidential proceedings of the commission
automatically created a clear and present danger to the orderly administration ofjustice.
See id. at 842-45.
333. See McCormick on Evidence, supra note 325, § 343, at 968-69; Cleary, Presuming
and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 11-14 (1959).
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sumptions about the impact of lawyer speech.334
The probability of the fact-prejudicial impact-is difficult to gauge
for the very reason that the presumption may be needed in the first
place-difficulty of proof in a particular case. Nonetheless, probability
considerations generally counsel against the presumption. In the vast
majority of criminal cases, pretrial publicity and extrajudicial statements
by trial attorneys have no impact,335 in large part because most cases do
not reach trial. Moreover, even when there is publicity and a trial, there
are measures short of restricting speech to prevent or ameliorate prejudi-
cial impact. As the Court observed in Nebraska Press, "[i]n the over-
whelming majority of criminal trials, pretrial publicity presents few
unmanageable threats to this important right.3- 3 6
The policy considerations can be framed as follows: Assigning to the
disciplinary authority the burden of showing a threat to fair trial may
result in erroneous denial of a valid claim of trial unfairness arising from
improper prosecutor speech. Placing on the speaker the burden to show
lack of threat, however, may mistakenly sanction speech that should be
protected. The Supreme Court generally has refused to accept a pre-
sumption that speech causes harm. In Landmark Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia,"3 7 it declined to defer to the finding of the Virginia legislature
that the divulgence of confidential proceedings of a judicial conduct com-
mission automatically created a clear and present danger to the orderly
administration of justice.138 Even if a prosecutor knows that his com-
ments to the press will have no effect on the prospective factfinder, he
334. Justice Stewart's comments made in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), are
pertinent here:
We must often proceed in a state of less than perfect knowledge, either because
the facts are murky or the methodology used in obtaining the facts is open to
question. It is then that we must look to the Constitution for the values that
inform our presumptions. And the importance to our society of the full flow of
information to the public has buttressed this Court's historic presumption in
favor of First Amendment values.
Id. at 736 n.19 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The competing state interests were those of
effective law enforcement and ensuring effective grand jury proceedings as opposed to the
burden on news gathering said to result from insisting that reporters respond to relevant
questions during a grand jury investigation or criminal trial. See id. at 682.
335. See A. Howard & S. Newman, Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, Fair Trial and Free Expression: A Background Report, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (Comm. Print 1976); Frasca, supra note 3, at 169 (estimating that
press-induced bias would occur in only one of every 10,000 cases); Pember, Does Pretrial
Publicity Really Hurt?, Colum. Journ. Rev. 16, 20 (Sept.-Oct. 1984). One study found
publicity is an issue in very few cases. During 1976 to 1980, only 368 of the 63,000
appeals in criminal cases to highest state appellate courts claimed that news coverage
prejudiced the trial outcome. Reversals based on publicity were ordered in only 18 cases.
See Spencer, The So-Called Problem of Prejudicial Publicity Is a Red Herring, 2 Comm.
Law. 11, 11-12 (Spring 1984). In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976),
the Supreme Court recognized that reversal of a conviction on the ground that publicity
had prevented a fair trial is rare. See id. at 552-54.
336. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 551.
337. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
338. See id. at 845. But see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (showing of
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may be deterred from speaking because of "doubt whether [(no threat to
fair trial)] can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do
so."339 Presuming that speech is protected unless the state proves other-
wise limits the tendency to self-censor otherwise protected expression.340
However, the prosecutor's role is an important consideration in limited
circumstances.
The prosecutor has a duty to secure fair trial interests because he is
representing the state, and protecting the constitutional guarantees of fair
trial and due process are the state's obligation. The prosecutor does not
sacrifice first amendment rights and can play an important informing
function in furtherance of first amendment values, but his roles as-officer
of the court and representative of the state in a criminal prosecution
point to imposing part of the risk of uncertainty upon the prosecutor
when statements are made that violate narrowly framed no-comment
rules.
If such out-of-court statements are made, under certain circumstances
the prosecutor should bear the burden of production to show that the
statements did not pose a serious and imminent threat to fair judicial
administration. First, the presumption would apply only to statements
made before the trial court has effective jurisdiction to perform its Shep-
pard management functions. After that point, general rules pose larger
overbreadth concerns. Second, the presumption would apply only if the
prosecution proceeded to jury selection, or if there is evidence that extra-
judicial prosecutor speech influenced a plea disposition or selection of the
factfinder.341 Each of those circumstances should supply a source of evi-
dence to fulfill the burden of production. Absent those two conditions,
imposing the obligation to prove a negative undercuts the degree of harm
showing deemed essential by courts for first amendment protection. The
disciplinary complainant would in all instances bear the ultimate burden
of persuasion that the speech in fact posed a serious and imminent
threat.3 42 This allocation is consistent with the general practice of plac-
ing the burden of proof on the party charging a violation to establish
each element of the claim.343
Policy considerations inform not only the allocation of proof but also
actual unfairness unnecessary when record shows saturation publicity of the accused's
pretrial confession).
339. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
340. The principle that the burden of showing that speech is unprotected should not be
placed on the speaker has been followed in First Amendment cases involving obscenity,
see Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971), defamation, see Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986), and invasion of privacy, see Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune, 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 126, 188 Cal. Rptr 762, 778 (1983).
341. This condition is included because a few criminal trials may be conducted without
a jury due to the defendants' personal concerns about the effects of pretrial press
coverage.
342. This approach was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Rachmiel,
90 N.J. 646, 449 A.2d 505 (1982), and In re Hinds, 90 NJ. 604, 449 A.2d 483 (1982).
343. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-15 (1977).
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the degree of proof required. For example, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,3" the Supreme Court held that a public official defamation
plaintiff must prove with the "convincing clarity which the constitutional
standard demands"345 that the defendant published false and defamatory
statements with actual malice. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,346 the
Court reaffirmed the view that public officials and public figures must
prove actual malice by "clear and convincing" evidence.347 The "clear
and convincing proof" burden reflected a judgment that reducing the
risk of invading free expression rights justified departure from the pre-
ponderance of evidence norm.348 Comparable use of this procedural de-
vice may be employed in the extrajudicial lawyer speech area.349 For
example, when the case is tried to the bench, requiring that threat to trial
fairness be proved by clear and convincing evidence comports with the
shift in free speech and fair trial balance that occurs when a case is tried
to a judge rather than a jury.350
F. Scienter
Model Rule 3.6 contains two scienter elements. First, the no-comment
rules apply to statements "that a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication," an objective standard.
Second, the rule proscribes statements that the lawyer "knows or reason-
ably should know.. . will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding," a standard with objective and
subjective alternatives.3"' Rule DR 7-107 contains the first requirement
only, and is in this respect constitutionally vulnerable in not expressly
requiring a showing that the speaker knew or should have known the
speech was threatening to fair judicial process. 352
Model Rule 3.6 arguably goes further than the first amendment may
require in a situation in which the prosecutor intends to influence the
344. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
345. Id. at 285-86.
346. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1975).
347. d at 342.
348. See, eg., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (clear and convincing
proof for civil commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966) (clear and con-
vincing proof for deportation).
349. Although it upheld a less stringent First Amendment standard than in Bauer, the
Hinds court held that the "reasonable likelihood standard requires a showing by clear
and convincing evidence that an attorney's extrajudicial speech truly jeopardized trial
fairness." In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 626, 449 A.2d 483, 495 (1982).
350. See supra text accompanying notes 167-173.
351. See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (1987), reprinted in Appendix II.
352. See Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691, 1699 (1990) (finding existence of scienter
requirement in child pornography statute to be factor in rejecting first amendment over-
breadth attack on that statute); Florida Star v. BJ.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2612 (1989) (find-
ing lack of a scienter requirement a constitutional infirmity in Florida statute that makes
it unlawful to disclose through media the name of a sexual offense victim); Smith v. Cali-
fornia, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959) (holding unconstitutional an obscenity ordinance be-
cause its lack of a scienter requirement posed undue threat to stifle protected expression).
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outcome of the trial through extrajudicial publicity. This would violate
the prosecutor's duty as representative of the state to safeguard the fair-
ness of the criminal justice process. When proof of intent to prejudice
the factfinder through extrajudicial publicity is available, a lesser stan-
dard of threatened prejudice, such as reasonable likelihood, should be
compatible with free speech values.3-3 Requiring proof of threatened
harm would respond to the first amendment self-censorship and inform-
ing function concerns, but the state's interest in safeguarding fair judicial
administration should afford it some leeway in preventing a state repre-
sentative from employing speech directed to undermining that goal." 4
Self-censorship may arise when a prosecutor wishes to speak, is not at-
tempting to taint the process, but fars a disciplinary process will reach
an erroneous finding on intent or potential harm. Nonetheless, in light of
the interest in fair adjudication and the prosecutor's duty to secure it,
striking the balance of competing values by requiring proof of reasonable
likelihood of harm accommodates speech interests in a manner similar to
the balance struck in the public person defamation area, which ensures
the speaker that only awareness of falsity will expose him to liability.3 5
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell35 6 that "in the world of debate about public affairs, many things
done with motives that are less than admirable are protected by the First
Amendment."3 ' However, when the representative of the state who has
a constitutional obligation to respect fair trial rights acts with intent to
undermine those rights, and has a reasonable likelihood of succeeding,
such a combination should overcome the prosecutor's and public's first
353. In In re Lasswell, 296 Or. 121, 673 P.2d 855 (1983), the Oregon Supreme Court
decided that DR 7-107(B) is compatible with free speech protections if(1) the prosecutor
spoke with intent to influence the factfinding process or (2) knew his statements posed a
serious and imminent threat to a fair trial and acted with indifference to that effect. See
id. at 126-27, 673 P.2d at 858. The court did not indicate whether there must be some
showing of likelihood of harm if the intent test were met, and the opinion was ambiguous
as to whether a likelihood of harm showing is necessary when the knowledge and indiffer-
ence test is satisfied. See id.; see also In re Burrows, 290 Or. 131, 135, 618 P.2d 1283,
1285 (1980) (dismissing disciplinary action against district attorney for reading to high
school class a letter from defendant to mother, because of no likelihood of any prejudicial
effect).
354. The Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), underscored
the precept that speaker intent to incite or cause harm could not alone justify a speech
abridgement. The speech must be "likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447
(footnote omitted). Both danger and intent are required. For that reason, even the most
brazen publicity attempt to prejudice a jury must pose some realistic threat before disci-
pline could be imposed. Because no criminal sanction is involved and because the prose-
cutor assumes a duty to ensure a fair trial, a reasonable likelihood of threat coupled with
a showing of bad faith speech is an appropriate balance of speech and fair trial concerns.
Because intent may be inferred from the creation of danger, see Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), a clear and convincing proof standard on the intent issue may be
necessary.
355. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-80 (1964).
356. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).




G. Timing of the Speech
A natural reaction to extrajudicial prosecutor speech is the following:
"Wait and say it after the trial" or "Let someone else make those state-
ments." The Court's answer has been that government may not justify
content-based regulations by claiming that other speakers have expressed
the information or ideas or that the expression may be voiced in another
place, at another time, or in another manner.35 9 The "after the trial"
suggestion, whether embodied in a rule imposing subsequent punishment
for speech or in a judicial prior restraint, would allow the government to
destroy the immediacy of the intended speech. 6° Limitations on "utter-
ances made during the pendency of a case... produce their restrictive
results at the precise time when public interest in the matters discussed
would naturally be at its height.1361
Nonetheless, the point at which the speech occurs has implications for
analysis of the competing interests. A court does not have jurisdiction
during the initial investigative phase, and the defendant may not have
counsel who is aware of the investigation. Under these circumstances, it
358. See, eg., Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 313-15, 369 S.E.2d 232, 237-39 (courts,
in determining prosecutor disqualification from case, consider whether prosecutors' im-
proper remarks to jury were part of "calculated" plan to prejudice the defendant in the
minds of the jurors), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 225 (1988); Commonwealth v. Anderson,
294 Pa. Super. 1, 10-12, 439 A.2d 720,724-25 (1981) (prosecutor intentionally attempted
to influence trial through statements to the press, thereby barring retrial despite manifest
necessity for mistrial).
359. See, ag., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541
n.10 (1980) ("we have consistently rejected the suggestion that a government may justify
a content-based prohibition by showing that speakers have alternative means of expres-
sion"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 757 n.15 (1976) (invalidating state ban on advertising of prices of prescription
drugs; held irrelevant that consumers might be able to obtain the same information in
some other ways); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 & n.4 (1974) (reversing con-
viction for taping removable peace symbol onto flag displayed in apartment window, and
"summarily" rejecting the state court's argument that the inhibition on speech was "min-
iscule and trifling" because of "other means" that could have been used to express the
same views; the availability of other means are irrelevant when government prosecutes
"for the expression of an idea through activity"). In contrast, when dealing with what it
considers to be content-neutral restrictions on speech, the Cou. often has inquired into
the availability of alternative avenues of communication. See, eg., Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (upholding National Park Service
anti-camping regulations as applied to protesters attempting to call attention to the plight
of homeless).
360. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976); Carroll v. President
of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182-83 (1968); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392
(1962); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-50 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 268-69 (1941).
361. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 268; see also Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
242, 249-50 (7th Cir. 1975) (only comments that pose a serious and imminent threat of
interference with fair administration of justice can be constitutionally proscribed), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
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prevent prejudice from publicity.3 66 The judge is in the best position to
assess and implement what the Sheppard Court called "remedial meas-
ures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception." 367 Relying on ap-
pellate review is disfavored because "reversals are but palliatives. ' ' 368 By
implication, discipline of lawyers for violation of no-comment rules is
also disfavored.
Balanced against the remedial preference for restraining orders over
rules is the first amendment tradition disfavoring prior restraints. The
Supreme Court consistently has viewed prior restraints as especially bur-
densome on free expression, as reflected in its striking a statute authoriz-
ing newspaper nuisance prior restraints in Near v. Minnesota ex rel
Olson 369 and rejecting judicial restraints in New York Times Co. v. United
States37 and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.371 Although the doc-
trine has been used to "invalidate such a variety of restrictions on
speech!'372 that some have questioned the conceptual clarity of the term
prior restraint,373 an order restricting extrajudicial lawyer speech
manifests the central feature of prior restraints: government suppression
of speech prior to publication.
The Supreme Court has declared repeatedly that "[a]ny system of
prior restraints ... comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity. 37 4 One reason is that prior restraints
can effectively destroy the immediacy of the intended speech,375 in part
because ignoring an injunction against speech may forfeit the right to
assert a first amendment constitutional defense in a subsequent prosecu-
tion for contempt under the collateral bar rule.376 The rule, applicable to
injunctions generally, is that an injunction "must be obeyed until it is set
aside, and that persons subject to the [injunction] who disobey it may not
defend against the ensuing charge of criminal contempt on the ground
that the order was erroneous or even unconstitutional. 3 77
366. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1976); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-63 (1966).
367. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363.
368. Id.
369. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
370. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
371. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
372. L. Tribe, supra note I1, § 12-34, at 1040.
373. See, eg., Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 Yale L.J. 409, 437 (1983).
374. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (citations omitted).
375. See Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1968).
376. Compare Shuttlesworth v. Burmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (individual may re-
fuse to comply with local ordinance requiring parade permit and still raise law's facial
invalidity as defense in subsequent prosecution) with Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S.
307 (1967) (collateral bar rule precludes raising defense of unconstitutionality of injunc-
tion against contempt charge, with some exceptions).
377. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 539, 552 (1977). But see
In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1353 (1st Cir. 1986) (TRO against newspa-
per transparently unconstitutional; collateral bar rule does not preclude reversal of crimi-
nal contempt conviction), modified in part, 820 F.2d 1354, 1355 (1st Cir. 1987) (per
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is unlikely that the eventual trial court can perform the Sheppard man-
agement function to ensure a fair proceeding. 6 It is therefore at this
stage that the general no-comment rules play their most important role.
Once the case has been charged and a trial court has jurisdiction, the trial
court can take steps to deal with publicity problems. 63
Because the Sheppard Court expected the trial judge to take primary
responsibility for this task, and because the judge can tailor limits on
public comment more narrowly than the no-comment rules, some rea-
sons for reliance on no-comment rules to preserve fair judicial adminis-
tration disappear once the trial judge has jurisdiction over the case. The
rules are still needed when the trial judge is unwilling or unable to re-
strain counsel intent on and effective at influencing judicial proceedings
with out-of-court statements. Once the court has jurisdiction, however,
concern about the breadth of no-comment rules should be higher; ac-
cordingly, when the prosecutor makes a statement falling within one of
the proscribed areas of comment, there should be no presumption of a
threatened prejudicial impact.
Finally, the justification for no-comment rules is weakest during the
post-trial or post-disposition sentencing phase when the judge is the sen-
tencer. The sentencing inquiry is ordinarily very broad, both as to the
kind of information considered and its source.3 Both Bauer and
Hirschkop held that restrictions on comment could not be imposed pend-
ing sentencing because the sentencing judge is entitled to conduct a broad
inquiry and consider almost any factor in exercising his sentencing
discretion.365
H. Restraining Orders
Sheppard and Nebraska Press stressed the trial court's responsibility to
use various techniques, including curbs on extrajudicial lawyer speech, to
362. The Sheppard Court seemed to recognize this when it observed that control of
trial participant speech might have prevented prejudicial publicity "at least after Shep-
pard's indictment." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966). As the Bauer court
observed, "since there are no formal court proceedings pending there is no opportunity to
obtain a specific pre-trial order limiting out-of-court statements." Bauer, 522 F.2d at
252. The Hirschkop court pointed out that during the investigatory stage "it is difficult
for a court to protect the accused by entering orders restricting comments on an ad hoc
basis." Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 365 (4th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (en bane).
363. As previously noted, this Article does not address prosecutor leaks of matters that
occur before the grand jury. The traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings has been
viewed as serving mainly the grand jury's screening and investigatory functions rather
than protecting the accused's fair trial. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958).
364. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); 18 U.S.C. § 3562 (1988)
(previously codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3577).
365. See Hirschkop, 594 F.2d at 366; Bauer, 522 F.2d at 251; see also Seitz Report,
supra note 58, at 527-28 (eliminating recommended court no comment rule prohibiting
lawyer comment pending sentencing).
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Nebraska Press reviewed a court order prohibiting the reporting of the
existence or nature of any confessions, admissions, or other information
"strongly implicative" of an accused murderer's guilt. The case involved
the brutal slaying of six members of a family in a small Nebraska town;
the autopsies contained evidence of necrophilia. Immediate widespread
publicity included reports of incriminating statements by the accused.378
Chief Justice Burger, joined by four other members of the Court, wrote
that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and
the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.' 379 To de-
termine whether such an order can be justified, a court must consider (1)
the nature and extent of news coverage, (2) alternative measures to miti-
gate prejudicial publicity, and (3) the effectiveness of a restraining or-
der. 8 Although the Nebraska trial judge could reasonably have
predicted that a large portion of the venire would be exposed to the pub-
licity, he could only speculate that jurors exposed to such information
would be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.3 81 The gag order
was therefore defective because the state courts had failed to find that
measures short of an order restraining all publication-change of venue,
postponement of the trial, voir dire of the jury panel for bias, instructions
to the jury to consider only the evidence presented in court, and jury
sequestration-would not effectively mitigate any adverse impact of pub-
licity.382 Indeed, because it would be speculative to conclude that any
such measure would have failed, the Court must have meant that the
alternatives should be tried before any restraint is imposed.38 3
curiam) (en bane) (collateral bar rule not applicable if publisher made good faith timely
effort to appeal constitutionality of order), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
378. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541-43 (1976).
379. Id. at 559.
380. See id. at 562.
381. See id. at 568-69.
382. See id, at 563-64. The Court also doubted the efficacy of the order in protecting
the defendant's right to a fair trial. See id. at 565-67.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court contained a doctrinal aberration. He
wrote that to judge the prior restraint, the Court should be guided by a test Chief Judge
Learned Hand formulated in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd,
341 U.S. 494 (1951), which asked whether "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger,"
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562 (quoting Dennis, 183 F.2d at 212). Dennis, however, did
not involve a prior restraint. The Dennis test to judge subversive speech was made con-
siderably more stringent in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiaxm),
which permits government regulation of subversive advocacy only if (1) "directed to in-
citing or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) "likely to incite or produce such
action." Id. at 447. The anomaly of Nebraska Press is that it endorsed a standard less
protective of speech than Brandenburg when conventional prior restraint theory would
call for a test more protective than Brandenburg. See Schmidt, Nebraska Press Associa-
tion: An Expansion of Freedom and Contraction of Theory, 29 Stan. L. Rev. 431, 458-66
(1977).
383. See Prettyman, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. Have We Seen the Last of




Restraining prosecutor speech would leave the press free to report on
the criminal proceedings. Although courts have recognized that such
orders raise free press issues by impeding the ability to gather news and
therefore have granted the press standing to challenge them, 3 4 there is
little support for the notion that a press or lawyer challenge to such re-
straints should be judged as strictly as the prior restraints in Near or
Nebraska Press.3 85 Courts recognize a material difference between re-
straining orders against the press and restraining orders against trial par-
ticipants.386 In Nebraska Press, both Chief Justice Burger's opinion for
the Court and Justice Brennan's concurrence recognized limits on lawyer
comment as a preferable alternative to gagging the press. 3 7
In view of the trial court's responsibility under Sheppard to foster and
safeguard a fair trial, the prosecutor's role as an advocate for the commu-
nity, and the much narrower scope of a restraint on trial participants
than one on the press, the cases properly regard a restraint on the prose-
cutor as less threatening to first amendment values than one on the press.
There must be, of course, a finding that extrajudicial prosecutor state-
ments are likely to be made and that such statements may prejudice the
proceedings. 388 The test of reasonable likelihood of serious threat should
be compatible with the prosecutor's and the court's roles.389 In accord
384. See, ag., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 606-08 (2d Cir. 1988), cerl de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988); Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United States Dist. Ct.,
781 F.2d 1443, 1445-46 (9th Cir. 1986); National Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman, 116
A.D.2d 287, 289, 501 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (1986). The Nebraska Press Court referred to
this issue of judicially imposed restraints on lawyers interfering with press rights to news
sources, but declined to address it because "[w]e are not now confronted with such is-
sues." Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 564 n.8.
385. There is a split in the circuits over what the standard of review should be when
the press challenges a restraining order imposed on trial participants. See Dow Jones &
Co. v. Simon, 109 S. Ct. 377, 378 (1988) (White, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). Compare Radio & Television News Ass'n v. United
State Dist. Ct., 781 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard used was "reasonable likeli-
hood" that pretrial publicity would prejudice defendant's right to fair trial) with CBS v.
Young, 522 F.2d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 1975) (employing a "clear and present danger"
standard).
386. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 1979); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976);
Young, 522 F.2d at 238-39; United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cerL
denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Ruggieri v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 503 F. Supp.
1036, 1040 (D.R.L 1980); United States v. Marcano Garcia, 456 F. Supp. 1354, 1356
(D.P.R. 1978); Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 112 MI1. 2d 223, 243-44, 492 N.E. 2d 1327,
1336-37 (1986); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 780, 787, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203, 208 (Sup. Ct.
1976); see also Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 Stan. L. Rev.
411, 427-28 (1977) (all gags on media are direct interference with free press; such orders
on trial participants can "pass first amendment muster ... [if] there is a compelling
reason to abridge the right to speak").
387. See Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 564, 601 (Brennan, J., concurring); supra text
accompanying notes 203-221.
388. See, e.g., In re New York Times, 16 Media L. Rptr. (BNA) 1877, 1878 (2d Cir.
1989) (vacating gag order on counsel in criminal case because there was no showing of
either a willing speaker or likely prejudice).
389. See National Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman, 116 A.D.2d 287, 292, 501
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with Nebraska Press and the first amendment sensitivity to prior re-
straints, the trial court must examine the following three factors: the
nature and extent of publicity, alternative measures to mitigate the preju-
dicial effects of publicity, and the effectiveness of a restraining order in
preventing the threatened danger.3" The Nebraska Press directive that
alternatives to restraint be exhausted would, as applied here, create a
hierarchy. If restraint on the press is the last resort (assuming that it
continues to be an alternative at all), restraints on the trial participants
should be a second-to-last resort.3 91 Such consideration of less restrictive
alternatives has been the required course in lawyer speech restraint cases
since Nebraska Press.92 One possible exception to lawyer restraint as a
second-to-last resort may be jury sequestration, 393 with its attendant in-
convenience, expense, and potential for skewing the jury, especially if
there is evidence that the prosecutor's out-of-court statements are being
made with the intent to bias the proceeding. 394
I. Judicial Review
In many jurisdictions, enforcement of the no-comment rules originates
in bar administrative proceedings and is subject to judicial review. Be-
cause the factual questions concerning degree of harm and knowledge or
intent of the speaker can be exceptionally difficult to resolve and because
free speech is at stake, it is important that application of the no-comment
rules shows "the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression." 395 One
lesson of the obscenity cases is that a judicial body, following an adver-
N.Y.S.2d 405, 408 (1986); People v. Dupree, 88 Misc. 2d 787, 789, 388 N.Y.S.2d 203,
209.
390. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976); NationalBroadcast-
ing, 116 A.D.2d at 293, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 409. In Bailey v. Systems Innovation, Inc., 852
F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed this course of
analysis in striking down a pretrial order based on the Middle District of Pennsylvania
Local Rule 118.7 governing "Extrajudicial Statements by Attorneys in Civil Cases." See
id. at 99-101
391. In In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 611 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 377
(1988), the Second Circuit approved of the trial court's exploring available alternatives to
a gag order: "The precautions share one thing in common: each must be explored and
ultimately rejected as inadequate-individually and in combination-as a remedy for
prejudicial pretrial publicity before a restraining order is entered." Id.; see Connecticut
Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38, 43 (D. Conn. 1987) (finding state court's impo-
sition of gag order on criminal trial counsel improper for failure to make findings on
effectiveness of alternatives).
Although disfavored relative to other techniques, a restraining order on counsel may
be necessary in conjunction with other measures to ameliorate or prevent prejudice from
publicity. See, eg., State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 35, 524 A.2d 130, 141 (1987) (con-
tinuance and restraint on counsel employed).
392. See Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 611.
393. See M. Franklin, Mass Media Law 521-23 (3d ed. 1987).
394. See supra text accompanying notes 355-360.
395. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
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sary hearing, must decide the protected character of speech.3 96 This
principle rests on differences between courts and administrative agencies
in their capacity to protect constitutional rights.39 A related principle of
review in cases involving first amendment interests is that appellate
courts should independently examine the record to ensure that govern-
ment action "does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression."398 Courts reviewing administrative findings of no-comment
rule violations accordingly should conduct independent reviews of the
record,3 99 as should courts reviewing a trial court's determination of the
need for restraining extrajudicial lawyer comment.
CONCLUSION
This discussion leads to several general conclusions: (1) prosecutor
speech is entitled to first amendment protection because the prosecutor
retains a constitutional right to self-expression and because the speech
informs the public about matters of public concern; (2) such speech may
not be subject to regulation unless it threatens to undermine the ac-
cused's fair trial rights or the fair and efficient administration of justice;
and (3) the first amendment precludes sanctions or restraints on the press
or public that may be imposed on the prosecutor because the prosecutor
performs a unique role in the criminal justice system.
Accommodation of the competing values in the complex and changing
context of prosecutor speech calls for adjustments in the manner and
scope of regulation that is applicable to prosecutors. This is necessary to
avoid unnecessary compromise of either free speech or fair trial values.
This Article has suggested how these adjustments could be structured
within the prevailing system of disciplinary or court rules and restraining
orders. The complex and changing context also suggests that fair trial
396. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 520-26(1970).
397. See id. at 520-24.
398. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,285 (1964). This is a well-established
precept in the defamation area as well as other speech contexts. See, ag., Harte-Hanks
Communications v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2696-98 (1989) (defamation); Jenkins
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974) (obscenity); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-
09 (1973) (per curiam) (incitement to violence); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592(1969) ("fighting words"); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (parade
to protest segregation); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (newspaper's
criticism of judges).
399. An example of a court failing to do this and thereby affirming a decision that
arguably was insensitive to first amendment interests was In re Hansen, 584 P.2d 805(Utah 1978). Hansen involved an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from a determina-
tion by the Utah State Bar Commission that the Attorney General, when serving as Dep-
uty Attorney General, made statements on television about a pending prosecution in
violation of DR 7-107(B)(6). See id. at 806. The court held that the Commission's deci-
sion would be affirmed "unless it appears that the Commission has acted arbitrarily or
unreasonably." Id. at 807. The court reduced the Commission's recommended sanction
from one-year suspension to censure and a reprimand, but did not address the first
amendment and degree of potential harm issues. See ia
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and administration of justice concerns are not the exclusive interests that
may justify limits. For example, if they are narrowly drafted and if a
sufficient showing of threat and the absence of alternative protective
measures can be made, a rule or restraining order may properly be en-
forced to protect personal security interests of witnesses and victims.
Rules and restraints must be assessed on overbreadth and vagueness
grounds. The disciplinary and court rules have evolved in response to
both concerns, combining specific categories of potentially threatening
statements with a requirement of a specific degree of threatened harm.
Courts properly have found the need for the latter to avoid overbreadth
and have ruled the former vague and overbroad in particular cases. In-
deed, provisions remain in Model Rule 3.6 that are open to vagueness
and overbreadth questions.' The specific categories should serve both
the notice-giving and least restrictive limit functions. Overbreadth con-
cerns can vary depending on the timing of the speech and the identity of
the factfinder. Accordingly, the suggestions summarized below are based
in part on sensitivity to overbreadth.
Disciplinary or court rules controlling prosecutor speech should ad-
dress the degree of harm, burden of proof, knowledge and intent of the
speaker, timing of the speech, and identity of the factfinder. It is virtu-
ally impossible to discuss one of these factors without reference to an-
other, and the following summary reflects this overlap.
Degree of harm: In general, prosecutor speech should not be subject to
regulation unless it poses a serious and imminent threat of prejudice to a
judicial proceeding. Factors relating to intent of the speaker, type of
factfinder, and timing of the speech would allow for adjustment of the
degree of harm showing to account for a shifting balance in the speech
and fair trial interests.
Knowledge or intent: Prosecutor speech should not be subject to disci-
pline unless the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know that his
extrajudicial comments will be reported publicly and will pose a substan-
tial threat of prejudice to the judicial process. In light of the prosecutor's
obligation to secure due process, if there is proof that the prosecutor
knew or intended that the speech would prejudice the judicial proceed-
ing, the reasonable likelihood standard should apply.
Burden ofproof. If the prosecutor reveals information proscribed by a
narrowly drawn no-comment rule before a court has jurisdiction to ad-
dress publicity problems, and if the case proceeds to jury selection or his
public comment influences a plea disposition or choice of factflnder, he
will need to produce evidence to rebut a presumption that the speech
posed the requisite degree of harm to justify discipline. The burden of
persuasion on whether the statement was made and on the degree of
harm would rest in all instances on the complainant. To avoid self-cen-
400. See supra text accompanying notes 216, 331-352.
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sorship, the burden of proving a no-comment rule violation should be
clear and convincing evidence.
Identity offactfinder: The balance of interests shifts when it is known
there will be no jury. Violation of a no-comment rule would not create a
presumption about the threat of potential harm unless there is evidence
that a jury was waived as a result of prosecutor publicity. Absent such
evidence, clear and convincing proof should be required to establish a
violation, as should a showing of actual prejudice. Because a sentencing
judge can receive and take into consideration a wide range of informa-
tion, the justification for no-comment rules is weakest during the sentenc-
ing phase and only a clear and convincing showing of actual prejudice
would justify discipline.
Timing of speech: To blunt the impact of prejudicial publicity without
using speech restraints, all burdens of production and proof to justify
discipline should shift toward the disciplinary authority if the speech oc-
curred when the court has jurisdiction. The period between guilt deter-
mination and sentencing should be governed by the standards applicable
to the trial and should vary depending on whether the judge or jury is
responsible for sentencing.
Restraining orders: Restraining extrajudicial speech in a particular
case, although a disfavored remedy, can and should be more narrowly
restrictive than general disciplinary rules and can also better safeguard
the fair trial interests. Lawyer discipline under the no-comment rules,
like reversals, are palliatives in terms of reaching a practical and effective
accommodation of interests. Unlike free speech issues that focus on re-
dressing consummated harm, such as defamation, the challenge here is to
prevent harm from occurring. The fair trial cases accordingly tend "to
concentrate on highly individualized factual" considerations. 401
Whether reasonable or serious and imminent likelihood of prejudice is
the standard for such a restraint, the critical protection for prosecutor
free speech interests is the court's obligation to consider alternatives to
speech restraints and whether restraints would be effective under the cir-
cumstances. Factual findings on these issues must be made to support
any limits.
The foregoing analysis of prosecutor speech points to emphasis and
refinement in accommodating free speech interests of the prosecutor and
the public, fair trial for the accused, and fair and efficient judicial admin-
istration. The emphasis should be on the responsibility of the trial judge
to address problems with prosecutor speech in the least restrictive and
most effective manner. The refinement should occur in the framing and
application of restraining orders and rules with sensitivity to overbreadth
and vagueness and the other factors mentioned above. The approach
presented here implies that defense counsel should have broad, though
not unlimited, first amendment protection for their extrajudicial
401. L. Tribe, supra note 11, § 12-11, at 861 (1988).
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speech. °2 It also leaves ample constitutional latitude for prosecutor
speech, more latitude than many, including myself, think is wise or
prudent.
The substantial first amendment protection for prosecutor speech sug-
gests the importance of inculcating fair trial values in legal education andjournalism training, of dispensing professional disapproval short of for-
mal discipline in appropriate circumstances, and perhaps the even
greater importance of developing and enforcing policies within prosecu-
tors' offices regarding public comment on pending cases. The last mea-
sure is subject to first amendment scrutiny °3 and may not always be
effective, especially as applied to the top elected or appointed prosecutor.
But addressing the issue as an office policy matter, as many have at-
tempted to do,404 may be the most practical way of dealing with the pros-
ecutor speech phenomenon. Accordingly, the law and journalism
classrooms, the newsrooms, the bar associations' continuing legal educa-
tion programs, and the prosecutors' offices are places where the constitu-
tional and prudential concerns are more often likely to be reconciled than
in the trial courts and in attorney disciplinary proceedings. By develop-
ing in these settings a deeper understanding of the competing interests
and the context of the speech, the first amendment values served by pros-
ecutor speech can be fostered, and the impact of the speech on competing
values tempered.
402. Defense counsel have been the focus of much of the writing on this topic. This
Article's analysis indicates that it would be compatible with the first amendment to regu-
late prosecutor speech to a greater degree than defense counsel extrajudicial speech.
However, the scope of this distinction needs further analysis than is presented here. See
Swift, supra note 13, at 83-84.
403. Cf Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143-49 (1983) (balancing employee's first
amendment rights against government's interest in promoting efficient public services).




DR 7-107 TRIAL PUBLICITY
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a
criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial
statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication and that does more than state without
elaboration:
(1) Information contained in a public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description
of the offense and, if permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assist-
ance in other matters and the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of
a criminal matter shall not, from the time of the filing of a complaint,
information, or indictment, the issuance of an arrest warrant, or arrest
until the commencement of the trial or disposition without trial, make or
participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and
that relates to:
(1) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including
arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to
a lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or
statement given by the accused or his refusal or failure to make a
statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the
refusal or failure of the accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective
witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the
evidence or the merits of the case.
(C) DR 7-107(B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from
announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the
accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, if any information
necessary to aid in his apprehension or to warn the public of any
dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
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(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use
of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies
and the length of the investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence
seized, other than a confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court
in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial
proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a
lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a crimi-
nal matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial state-
ment that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means
of public communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues in
the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment to public
records of the court in the case.
(E) After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a
criminal matter and prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law
firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall not make or partici-
pate in making an extra-judicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by public communication that is reason-
ably likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional
disciplinary proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when per-
tinent and consistent with other law applicable to such proceedings.
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not dur-
ing its investigation or litigation make or participate in making an extra-
judicial statement, other than a quotation from a reference to public
records, that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, wit-
ness, or prospective witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the
refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a
party, except as required by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
trial of the action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or
law firm associated therewith shall not make or participate in making a
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statement, other than quotations from or reference to public records, that
a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public
communication if it is made outside the official course of the proceeding
and relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal records of a party, wit-
ness, or prospective witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any exami-
nations or tests or the refusal of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or posi-
tions of an interested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair
hearing.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer
from replying to charges of misconduct publicly made against him or
from participating in the proceedings of legislative, administrative, or
other investigative bodies.
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees
and associates from making an extra-judicial statement that he would be
prohibited from making under DR 7-107.
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APPENDIX II
RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY
(a) A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reason-
able person would expect to be disseminated by means of public commu-
nication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have
a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding.
(b) A statement referred to in paragraph (a) ordinarily is likely to
have such an effect when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a
criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarcera-
tion, and the statement relates to:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity
of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarcera-
tion, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence
or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a
defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure to make a
statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the
refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or
the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or
suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in
incarceration;
(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed
create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or
(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, un-
less there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge
is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent
until and unless proven guilty.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and (b)(1-5), a lawyer involved in
the investigation or litigation of a matter may state without elaboration:
(1) the general nature of the claim or defense;
(2) the information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of the matter is in progress, including the
general scope of the investigation, the offense or clam or defense
involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the per-
sons involved;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information
necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person in-
volved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likeli-
1990]
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hood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest;
and
(7) in a criminal case:
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of
the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information
necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(ii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or
agencies and the length of the investigation.
